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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Jennifer Bishop gave birth to a son shortly before 8 a.m. in July 
of 1993.  Because she had decided not to breast-feed her child, that 
evening with dinner she received a tablet of Parlodel to prevent the 
production of breast milk.  The next several hours were horrible.  
Within an hour and a half she became nauseated and vomited at least 
twice.  Her blood pressure rose, and her temperature increased to 
over 102 degrees.  Within three hours she became drowsy and then 
rigid.  Approximately four hours after taking the drug, she was 
transferred to intensive care where she suffered respiratory arrest and 
lapsed into a coma.  Six hours later she was pronounced dead.1  In 
Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals,2 Jennifer’s estate and her husband 
sued Sandoz, the manufacturer of Parlodel, arguing the 2.5 mg she 
ingested was a “direct and proximate cause” of her death.  In support 
of this position, the plaintiffs offered the opinions of a number of 
experts.  The plaintiffs asserted that the experts’ opinions were based 
upon the standard medical methodology of “differential diagnosis.”3  
 
 1 Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 14 P.2d 1170, 1173-74 (Kan. 2000).  
According to the court, “[T]the autopsy reported that the probable cause of the 
death was ‘related to postpartum eclampsia’ or ‘possible bacteremia.’”  Definitions 
are appropriate here to assist the reader: “postpartum” means “[a]fter childbirth;” 
“eclampsia” is defined as the “[o]ccurrence of one or more convulsions, not 
attributable to other cerebral conditions such as epilepsy or cerebral hemorrhage, in 
a patient with preeclampsia;” and “bacteremia” is a condition characterized by 
“viable bacteria in the circulating blood.”  STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1413, 540, 
181 (26th ed. 1995). 
 2 14 P.2d 1170. 
 3 Id. at 1177.  In medical dictionaries, differential diagnosis is defined as a 
“diagnosis based on comparison of symptoms of two or more similar diseases to 
determine which the patient is suffering from.”  TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY 404 (14th ed. 1981).  However, in legal usage the term is not restricted to 
the process of distinguishing among diseases.  Rather, the term also is used to 
describe the process of differentiating among the possible causes of the plaintiff’s 
ailment.  That is what occurred in Kuhn.  It is with respect to this latter, perhaps 
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The defendant challenged the admissibility of this testimony.  The 
United Stated District Court for the District of Kansas, applying 
Kansas’s version of the Frye test for admissibility of expert testimony,4 
ruled that the plaintiffs’ experts, “improperly offer medical causation 
opinions concerning Parlodel without general acceptance of the 
bases for those opinions within the relevant scientific community . . . 
.”5  The Kansas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Frye test is 
not applicable to the type of expert testimony at issue in this case. 
In Kuhn, the court declined the judicial gatekeeping role in 
cases where experts offer “pure opinion” testimony.  Under the newly 
announced pure opinion exception, the Frye test only applies “when 
an expert witness reaches a conclusion by deduction from applying a 
new or novel scientific principal, formula, or procedure developed by 
others.”6  Opinions that do not rely on “techniques,” but rather are 
“developed from inductive reasoning based on the expert’s own 
experience, observation, or research”7 are not to be tested by Frye or 
any other admissibility test.  Rather, “[t]he validity of pure opinion is 
tested by cross-examination of the witness.”8 
As the court correctly notes, once this exception is created a 
critical question is whether the term “technique” is to be given a 
narrow or broad meaning.9  The Kansas Supreme Court adopts a 
narrow view of the term.  According to the court, the plaintiff’s 
experts’ opinions in Kuhn did not hinge on the validity of a scientific 
principal, device, test, or procedure developed by another but rather 
on the accuracy of their observation, the extent of their training, and 
the reliability of their interpretations.10  None of these are subject to 
 
incorrect usage, that differential diagnosis has become controversial in legal settings.  
For a general discussion of differential diagnosis testimony, see Joseph Sanders & 
Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation 
in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and Substantive Law, 64 LAW. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 107 (2001); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Clinical Medical Evidence of Causation in 
Toxic Tort Cases: Into the Crucible of Daubert, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 369 (2001). 
 4 In Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.D. Cir. 1923), the court held that novel 
expert testimony is admissible only when the scientific principle or technique from 
which it is deduced has gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs.  Kansas adopted the Frye “general acceptance” test in State v. Lowry, 185 P.2d 
147 (Kan. 1947).  For a more complete discussion of Frye, see infra Part II. 
 5 Kuhn, 14 P.2d at 1177. 
 6 Id. at 1179.  Kuhn borrows the test from a Florida appellate court opinion, 
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Tursi, 729 So. 2d 995, 997 (Fla. App. 1999). 
 7 Kuhn, 14 P.2d at 1179. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 1180. 
 10 Id. at 1182. 
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Frye.11  It appears likely that Kuhn will remove most, if not all, medical 
doctor differential diagnosis testimony from any judicial reliability 
assessment.12 
The Kansas Supreme Court justified its holding with the 
following arguments: 
The distinction between pure opinion testimony and testimony 
based on a scientific method or procedure is rooted in a concept 
that seeks to limit application of the Frye test to situations where 
there is the greatest potential for juror confusion . . . .  The 
distinction would be consistent with Kansas’ appellate decisions 
applying the Frye test, almost all of which have involved devices or 
tests surrounded by an “aura of infallibility” to which a trier of fact 
might tend to ascribe “an inordinately high degree of certainty.”13 
Judges generally are not trained in scientific fields and, like 
jurors, are lay persons concerning science.  A Kansas jury has a 
constitutional mandate to decide between conflicting facts, 
including conflicting opinions of causation.  The district judge . . . 
controls expert opinion evidence that would unduly prejudice or 
mislead a jury or confuse the question for resolution.  Cross-
examination, the submission of contrary evidence, and the use of 
appropriate jury instructions form a preferred method of 
resolving factual disputes.14 
To summarize, the court justifies its result by arguing for the 
following five propositions: 1) jurors are relatively unconfused by 
expert testimony that does not involve a “technique” such as a lie 
detector; 2) jurors are less confused by testimony based on an 
expert’s own investigations than they are by testimony based on the 
investigations of other researchers; 3) jurors are less confused by 
“inductive” reasoning than by “deductive” reasoning; 4) judges are no 
 
 11 Logerquist v. McVey reaches a similar conclusion in a case involving repressed 
memory testimony.  Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000).  The Logerquist 
court said: 
[a]lthough compliance with Frye is necessary when the scientist reaches 
a conclusion by applying a scientific theory or process based on the 
work or discovery of others, under [Arizona Rules of Evidence 702 and 
703] experts may testify concerning their own experimentation and 
observation and opinions based on their own work without first 
showing general acceptance. 
Id. at 123. 
 12 The plaintiff’s three experts offered to testify that Parlodel caused or 
contributed to Bishop’s death.  They arrived at this result through a process of 
“differential diagnosis” by which they considered and ruled out other causes.  Id. at 
1176-77. 
 13 Id. at 1181 (internal citations omitted). 
 14 Id. at 1182 (internal citations omitted). 
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better than jurors in assessing the merits of a scientific argument; and 
5) cross-examination, competing experts, and judicial instructions 
are adequate to the task of clearing up any residual jury confusion. 
Underlying the specific arguments in Kuhn is one central idea: 
the jury is better able to assess arguments like those offered by the 
plaintiffs’ experts than it is other types of expert evidence.  Implicit in 
this argument is the premise that restrictive evidentiary rules are best 
justified, if they are justified at all, as a way to protect juries, litigants, 
and the law itself from jury shortcomings.  Restrictive rules are, in a 
word, justified by appeals to paternalism.15 
The United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Kumho Tire Co., 
Ltd. v. Carmichael16 reflects this justification in the following passage: 
And whether the specific expert testimony focuses upon 
specialized observations, the specialized translation of those 
observations into theory, a specialized theory itself, or the 
application of such a theory in a particular case, the expert’s 
testimony often will rest “upon an experience confessedly foreign 
in kind to [the jury’s] own.”17  The trial judge’s effort to assure 
that the specialized testimony is reliable and relevant can help the 
jury evaluate that foreign experience, whether the testimony 
reflects scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.18 
The arguments in Kuhn offer a springboard for a discussion of the 
paternalistic justification and the empirical evidence now available to 
assess the merits of this justification.  Section II of this article situates 
the Kuhn opinion within the context of the existing rules concerning 
the admissibility of expert testimony, especially as they have 
developed in the aftermath of the United States Supreme Court 
opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.19  I note that 
although Daubert changed the criteria to be used in assessing the 
admissibility of expert testimony, it certainly was not the first opinion 
to introduce paternalistic considerations to this area of evidence.  
Section III sketches out the contours of a paternalistic argument 
developed by Alvin Goldman and others writing in the tradition of 
“naturalized epistemology,” an epistemology that builds on and takes 
its direction from empirical observations about how we know things.  
From this perspective, if paternalism is to justify exclusionary rules, 
 
 15 See Leslie A. Lunney, Protecting Juries From Themselves: Restricting the Admission of 
Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases, 48 SMU L. REV. 103 (1994). 
 16 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 17 Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 
15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901). 
 18 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149. 
 19 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2003 THE MERITS OF PATERNALISTIC JUSTIFICATION 885 
paternalism itself must be justified by an appeal to empirical evidence 
that informs us about the ability of actors in an institution to convey 
and understand information.  Building on this discussion, Section IV 
assesses the available empirical research on these topics and 
concludes with a brief discussion of the relationship between 
admissibility rules and the ends of justice.  Section V summarizes the 
existing evidence for a paternalistic approach, suggests some 
considerations courts should bring to the admissibility task, and 
briefly discusses other procedural justice concerns that may argue for 
the admissibility of evidence, even if this would reduce the overall 
accuracy of verdicts. 
II.  RULES CONCERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
Kuhn is a counter-revolutionary opinion.  It runs against the tide 
of heightened judicial scrutiny of expert testimony that is associated 
with the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.20  Indeed, Daubert is often said to have 
ushered in the “Daubert revolution.”21  In this Section, I provide a 
short review of the law with respect to admissibility of scientific 
evidence before and after Daubert. 
Kansas is one of a substantial number of states22 that still follows 
the admissibility rule first adopted in Frye v. United States.23  In Frye, the 
defendant, accused of murder, offered the results of a “systolic blood 
pressure deception test,” a precursor to the polygraph, as evidence of 
his innocence.  Prior to Frye, most courts only asked whether the 
expert was “qualified” before admitting the expert’s testimony and, in 
some jurisdictions, whether the subject matter in issue was beyond 
the range of knowledge of the average juror.24  However, Frye’s 
 
 20 Id.  The literature on Daubert is voluminous.  For a discussion of the ruling and 
its increasingly wide reach, see DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: 
THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ch. 1 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter FAIGMAN 
ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE]. 
 21 See David L Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations 
on the Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661 
(2000). 
 22 See David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the 
General Acceptance Test, 4 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 386 (2001); see also Heather G. Hamilton, 
The Movement from Frye to Daubert: Where Do the States Stand?, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 201 
(1999); Jolle Anne Moreno, Eyes Wide Shut: Hidden Problems and Future Consequences of 
the Fact-Based Reliability Standard, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. __ (forthcoming in Fall 
2003). 
 23 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  My discussion here borrows heavily from 
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at ch. 1. 
 24 FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at ch. 1.  For a 
general historical overview of the use of expert testimony, see Stephan Landsman, Of 
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expert’s testimony posed special problems because he proposed to 
testify to a novel technique that was not currently being used by a 
community of experts.  In a brief two-page opinion, Judge Van Orsdel 
placed an additional hurdle in the path of those who would 
introduce expert testimony.  The key passage established what has 
come to be called the “general acceptance test.”25  Expert testimony is 
admissible when the scientific principle or technique from which it is 
deduced has gained general acceptance in the particular field in 
which it belongs. 
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the 1970s, 
the Frye test began a slow decline in the federal courts.  While new 
theories and techniques gained general acceptance, the Frye test was 
criticized for being too conservative because it imposed a waiting 
period.26  In addition, others criticized the test as too liberal because 
of the difficulty of defining the relevant field within which general 
acceptance must be achieved.  If the field is narrowly defined to 
include the proffered expert and other like-minded individuals, little 
will be excluded.27 
These criticisms and the fact that the reporter’s notes 
accompanying the Federal Rules of Evidence did not even mention 
the case when discussing the admissibility of expert testimony caused 
a number of federal circuits to abandon the test.28  Other circuits, 
 
Witches, Madmen, and Products Liability: An Historical Survey of the Use of Expert Testimony, 
13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131 (1995).  See also David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal 
Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and 
Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1803-09 
(1994).  The classic exploration of this historical question is Hand, supra note 17. 
 25 The court in Frye held that: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between 
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.  
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle 
must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in 
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific 
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made 
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in 
the particular field in which it belongs. 
Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 26 For a case praising the conservative nature of Frye, see People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 
321, 325 (Cal. 1994). 
 27 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980). 
 28 The most influential early circuit court opinion rejecting Frye is United States v. 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).  In a case involving expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification, Judge Becker said that in order to be admitted the 
evidence must survive the trial court’s preliminary inquiry.  In an in limine 
proceeding, the judge should balance: (1) the reliability of the scientific principles 
the expert employed against (2) the likelihood that the evidence may overwhelm or 
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however, concluded Frye did survive the adoption of the Rules.29 
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,30 the Supreme 
Court officially ended the debate.  In a case involving the morning 
sickness drug Bendectin, the Court concluded that Frye’s rigid 
“general acceptance” standard is contrary to the thrust of the Federal 
Rules, which were intended to lower the barriers to expert opinion 
testimony.31  However, Daubert agreed that Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 does modify Rule 402’s directive to admit all relevant evidence.  
Rule 702 also requires reliability; evidence which is relevant but 
unreliable is inadmissible.32 
What constitutes reliability?  In this case, where all the experts 
purported to be scientists, the Court turned to science for an answer.  
Reliable opinions are those that are arrived at using the “methods 
and procedures of science.”33  In a footnote, the Court added, “[i]n a 
case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based 
upon scientific validity.”34 
Daubert did not offer a systematic presentation of what scientists 
mean when they inquire about validity, but it did propose the 
following four non-exclusive factors courts might consider when 
making a reliability/validity assessment: 1) whether the expert’s 
theory or technique is falsifiable and has been tested;35 2) the 
reliability of a procedure and its potential rate of error;36 3) whether 
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review37 and 
whether the results have been published;38 and 4) in a partial 
resurrection of the Frye test, whether the expert’s methods and 
reasoning enjoy general acceptance in a relevant scientific 
community.39 
 
mislead the jury.  In addition, the trial court should examine the “fit” between the 
proffered scientific testimony and the contested issues in the case.  Id. at 1226.  
Concern with reliability and fit have become cornerstones of post-Daubert 
jurisprudence.  The Fifth Circuit, in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., set out a 
similar test for admissibility.  Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 
(5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912 (1992). 
 29 United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 30 509 U.S. 579. 
 31 Id. at 588. 
 32 Id. at 590. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 590 n.9. 
 35 Id. at 593. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 593-94. 
 39 Id. at 594. 
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In addition, the Court noted that Rule 702 requires that the 
expert evidence “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue.”40  Justice Blackmun stated that, 
[t]his condition goes primarily to relevance . . . [t]he 
consideration has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one of 
“fit.”  “Fit” is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one 
purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated 
purposes.41 
The “fit” requirement involves an assessment of whether the expert’s 
chain of reasoning contains an inferential gap that is too wide.42 
In another footnote, the Court expressly limited Daubert to 
scientific evidence.  It noted that Rule 702 applies to “technical or 
other specialized knowledge” as well, but added, “[o]ur discussion is 
limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the 
expertise offered here.”43  Daubert left two related questions for later 
cases to answer: 1) does Daubert’s reliability requirement apply at all 
to non-scientific evidence; and 2) if it does apply, what role do the 
Daubert factors play in these cases?  These questions frequently arose 
with respect to the admissibility of clinical medical testimony similar 
 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 591 (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 
1985)). 
 42 Courts may find a lack of fit when the studies presented by the expert simply 
fail to support the expert’s position.  Using the “fit” requirement in this way causes 
courts to move close to excluding an expert’s testimony because of the expert’s 
conclusion.  This is something the Supreme Court in Daubert specifically cautioned 
against when it said that the focus of the 702 validity inquiry “must be solely on 
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”  Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 595. 
Most appellate courts downplayed the Supreme Court’s methodology-
conclusion distinction.  For example, in Paoli, an opinion following Daubert, Judge 
Becker himself stated “we think that [the distinction between principles and methods 
versus conclusions] has only limited practical import . . . a challenge to ‘fit’ is very 
close to a challenge to the expert’s ultimate conclusion about the particular case, 
and yet it is part of the judge’s admissibility calculus under Daubert.”  In re Paoli, 35 
F.3d 717, 746 (3d Cir. 1994). 
In General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Supreme Court ratified 
Judge Becker’s view: 
[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a 
district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing 
data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.  A court may conclude that 
there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the 
opinion proffered. That is what the District Court did here and we 
hold that it did not abuse its discretion in so doing. 
522 U.S. at 146. 
 43 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8. 
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to the testimony in Kuhn44 and other types of “experience” 
testimony.45 
The Supreme Court answered these two questions in Kumho Tire 
Co. v. Carmichael.46  The plaintiffs’ expert in Kumho Tire was prepared 
to testify that the tire failure, which led to the crash of the plantiffs’ 
minivan, was the result of a manufacturing or design defect, not a 
result of abuse.  The trial court excluded this testimony after finding 
that “none of the four admissibility criteria outlined by the Daubert 
court are satisfied in this case.”47  Because the expert testimony was 
the plaintiff’s only evidence of defect, the district court judge then 
granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion.48  The plaintiffs 
appealed, arguing that the district court should not have applied 
Daubert’s reliability framework because the case did not involve a 
“scientific” expert.49  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit agreed that Daubert applied only to scientific 
testimony.  Whether the expert’s testimony was or was not scientific 
would have little consequence if the court invoked uniformly 
stringent admissibility criteria.  The circuit court did assert that it was 
prepared to affirm a well-reasoned trial court decision to exclude the 
plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony on reliability grounds if, upon remand, 
the trial court did so without invoking the Daubert criteria.50  However, 
in another part of the opinion, the circuit court said, “[t]hus, the 
question in this case is whether Carlson’s testimony is based on his 
application of scientific principles or theories [which we should 
submit to a Daubert analysis] or on his utilization of personal 
 
 44 See, e.g., Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 126 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated, 
151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 45 See, e.g., Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 82 F.3d. 1513 (10th Cir. 1996).  
“The language in Daubert makes it clear the factors outlined by the Court are 
applicable only when a proffered expert relied on some principle or methodology.  
In other words, application of the Daubert factors is unwarranted in cases where 
expert testimony is based solely upon experience or training.”  Id. at 1518.  But see 
Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t seems exactly 
backwards that experts who purport to rely on general engineering principles and 
practical experience might escape screening by the district court simply by stating 
that their conclusions were not reached by any particular method or technique.  The 
moral of this approach would be, the less factual support for an expert’s opinion, the 
better.”). 
 46 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the 
Court concluded, inter alia, that trial courts’ 702 rulings should be reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard. 
 47 Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1414, 1521 (S.D. Ala. 1996). 
 48 Id. at 1524. 
 49 Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 50 Id. at 1436 n.9. 
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experience and skill with failed tires [which we would usually expect a 
district court to allow a jury to evaluate].”51  This suggests a more 
lenient admissibility standard for non-science experts and echoes the 
Kuhn court’s position that expert experience evidence should rarely 
be kept from juries. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and held that 
excluding Carlson’s testimony was not an abuse of discretion.52  The 
reliability requirement of Rule 702 applies to all expert testimony.53  
As to the role of the four Daubert factors, the court adopted a flexible 
position: 
We also conclude that a trial court may consider one or more of 
the more specific factors that Daubert mentioned when doing so 
will help determine that testimony’s reliability.  But, as the Court 
stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is “flexible,” and Daubert’s 
list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to 
all experts or in every case.  Rather, the law grants a district court 
the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine 
reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability 
determination.54 
It would be a mistake to read Kumho Tire to say that the trial 
 
 51 Id. at 1436. 
 52 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137. 
 53 The Court provides four reasons why Daubert’s general reliability requirement 
applies to all expert testimony.  First, the language of Rule 702 makes no relevant 
distinction between “scientific” knowledge and “technical” or “other specialized” 
knowledge.  Second, although the Daubert opinion did restrict itself to “scientific” 
knowledge, that was only because the issue presented in the case involved scientific 
expertise.  Third, the evidentiary rationale that underlies the gatekeeping 
requirement is that Rules 702 and 703 give wide latitude to all experts to offer their 
opinions, latitude that is unavailable to other witnesses.  This latitude is premised on 
the “assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge 
and experience of his discipline.”  526 U.S. 137, 147 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 
589).  Because the Rules grant this latitude to all experts, they all must meet the 
reliability standard.  Fourth, a rule that distinguishes between scientific experts and 
other experts would be very difficult if not impossible to administer. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 now has been revised to incorporate the main 
components of Daubert and Kumho Tire.  Amended Rule 702 provides as follows: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) 
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702 (as modified Dec. 1, 2000). 
 54 526 U.S. at 141-42. 
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court may simply ignore the Daubert factors in non-science cases.55  
The Court noted that “a trial court should consider the specific 
factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of 
the reliability of expert testimony.”56  Implicit in the Kumho Tire 
opinion is the belief that the justifications for restricting expert 
testimony are as valid when expertise is based on experience as when 
it is based on science, a point with which the Kansas Supreme Court 
presumably would disagree. 
Because there are many differences between the old Frye test and 
the Daubert-Kumho Tire line of cases, it is easy to lose sight of the fact 
that, when compared to an opinion like Kuhn, they share much in 
common.  Both the Frye approach and that of Daubert ask the judge to 
exclude relevant evidence if it is unreliable.  They differ in how to 
assess reliability and, perhaps, the height of the reliability hurdle over 
which the expert must jump. 
One justification for the reliability requirements is paternalistic.  
Restrictions on the admissibility of expert evidence shelter jurors 
from their own shortcomings.  Absent such rules, jurors will be more 
likely to reach an incorrect conclusion.  The Kuhn opinion is 
instructive precisely because it rejects the paternalistic justification for 
reliability standards. 
III.  PATERNALISTIC JUSTIFICATIONS IN LAW 
Paternalistic arguments are not restricted to the law of evidence.  
To the contrary, they are staples of law.  The state frequently 
constrains behavior on paternalistic grounds.  Laws, which dispense 
food stamps rather than cash, forbid gambling, regulate interest 
rates, bar dueling, and make suicide a crime, along with the 
Eighteenth Amendment were all designed to prevent people from 
acting in ways contrary to what others think are against their own self 
interest.57  Of course, paternalistic arguments do not always prevail.  
Other considerations may cause us to reject them either because we 
think they are misplaced—that people will act in their own best 
interest—or because of other considerations that outweigh the force 
of paternalistic considerations.  The pull of different considerations 
 
 55 See Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1999) (“In the vast 
majority of cases, the district court first should decide whether the factors mentioned 
in Daubert are appropriate.  Once it considers the Daubert factors, the court then can 
consider whether other factors, not mentioned in Daubert, are relevant to the case at 
hand.”). 
 56 526 U.S. at 152. 
 57 Much of this list comes from Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 19, 
20 (Rolf Satorius ed., 1983). 
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can be seen in one high-profile area: Supreme Court opinions 
concerning restrictions on commercial speech.58 
A.  Paternalism in Speech Cases 
Paternalistic arguments frequently arise in discussions regarding 
restrictions on commercial speech.  Typically, the legislature justifies 
restrictive enactments by arguing, inter alia, that the consumers of 
some messages would be better off without the communication 
because the information contained in the message would cause them 
to act against their own best interest and also, perhaps, against the 
best interests of the community. As Justice Thomas noted in his 
concurring opinion in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn. v. United 
States,59 the primary governmental justification for such restrictions 
are paternalistic; that is they are designed “to keep legal users of a 
product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in 
the marketplace.”60 
First Amendment free speech jurisprudence is an area where 
anti-paternalistic instincts are perhaps the strongest.  It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court generally rejects these 
justifications.61  In the area of commercial speech, however, such 
arguments have not met with universal failure.62 
 
 58 Paternalistic arguments also arise with respect to restrictions on obscenity, hate 
speech, and speech directed toward minors.  See, e.g., Catherine J. Ross, Anything 
Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children From Controversial Speech, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 427, 495 (2000). 
 59 527 U.S. 173. 
 60 Id. at 197. 
 61 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 189, 231-33 (1983); see also David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 
74 VA. L. REV 519, 543 (1988); Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s 
Good For General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 235, 267 (1998). 
 62 Anti-paternalism was an important rationale in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), a 1976 opinion often 
cited as the beginning of the court’s renewed interest in protecting commercial 
speech.  The Court expressly critiqued the paternalistic justifications offered by 
Virginia for restricting price advertising of prescription drugs.  Id. at 769-70.  On the 
other hand, the Court adopted a more paternalistic position in Posadas de Puerto Rico 
Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), permitting the government to restrict 
casino advertizing addressed to Puerto Rican citizens.  Then, in Florida Bar v. Went For 
It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995), the Court exhibited some sympathy toward a 
paternalistic argument for a bar association rule prohibiting lawyers from using 
direct mail to solicit personal injury clients within thirty days of an accident.  More 
recently, however, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), the 
Court rejected Rhode Island’s restriction on alcoholic beverage price advertising that 
the state defended on the ground that it was designed to promote temperance by 
reducing the consumption of alcohol by its citizens.  In the process it rejected the 
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Why have paternalistic arguments in this area been more central 
to, and met with slightly greater success, than in other areas of First 
Amendment jurisprudence?  Professor Daniel Halberstam argues that 
the centrality of paternalistic arguments in the commercial speech 
arena is due to a basic difference between these cases and other First 
Amendment opinions.63  Most First Amendment doctrine focuses on 
preserving the ability of speakers to communicate their views, but 
“commercial speech doctrine disclaims significant reliance on the 
speaker-based model, and instead focuses on the listener.”64  This 
“focus on the listener” reflects the fact that this area of First 
Amendment law does not view communicative interactions “as 
abstract exchanges of views between persons about whom nothing is 
known, but instead, as context-dependent interactions with purposes 
that can be judicially ascertained with a reasonable degree of 
confidence.”65  Professor Halberstam argues that we should assess 
 
argument advanced in Posadas that restrictions should be given more leeway if they 
regulate “vice” activities from which the state has a particularly strong interest in 
shielding its citizens.  44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 514.  This position was reaffirmed in 
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn. v. United States, 27 U.S. 173 (1999), where the 
Court held that a prohibition on broadcasting lottery information could not be 
applied to advertisements of lawful private casino gambling that were broadcast 
where such gambling is legal.  In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), 
the Court struck down Massachusetts’ restrictions on outdoor and point of sale 
advertising of tobacco products.  In Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 
(2002), the Court struck down an advertising restriction on compound drugs.  The 
government’s justification for the restriction was not based on paternalistic 
arguments, however.  535 U.S. at 370. 
44 Liquormart, Greater New Orleans, and Reilly have generated the usual volume of 
law review commentary both about these cases and their implication for related 
issues such as professional speech, restrictions on tobacco advertising, advertising 
prescription drugs, and ads extolling the beneficial effects of alcohol consumption.  
See Sean P. Costello, Strange Brew: The State of Commercial Speech Jurisprudence Before and 
After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681 (1997); see also 
Arlen W. Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First Amendment Protection for 
Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 587 
(2000); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional 
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999); Nat Stern, In Defense of the 
Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55 (1999); Martin H. Redish, 
Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589 (1996); Margaret 
Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Food and Drug Law, 74 TULANE L. REV. 815 (2000); 
Nancy K. Plant, Prescription Drug Promotion on the Internet: Tool for the Inquisitive or Trap 
for the Unwary?, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 89 (1998); Erik Bierbauer, Liquid Honesty: The 
First Amendment Right to Market the Health Benefits of Moderate Alcohol Consumption, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057 (1999); Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the 
Constitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at “The Greater Includes the Lesser,” 55 
VAND. L. REV. 693 (2002). 
 63 See Halberstam, supra note 62. 
 64 Id. at 831. 
 65 Id. at 830. 
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restrictions on commercial speech in terms of whether they sustain or 
improve the integrity of communication in the buyer-seller 
relationship.66  Using this qualitative approach, he would approve of 
the position set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission,67 that speech restrictions prohibiting false or 
deceptive advertising are permissible because they impede 
communication between a buyer and seller.68 
More difficult are the situations where the speech is not 
misleading, and where it could not be said that a perfectly rational 
and fully-informed consumer would be unable to assess the 
information and give it the attention it deserved.  Ultimately, 
restrictions in this situation must search for their justification in 
alleged listener shortcomings.69 
I find that I am in general agreement with the Halberstam 
position.  Restrictions on paternalistic grounds are most easily 
justified within the context of a specific set of communications 
directed at a defined purpose where parties play defined roles. 
B.  Paternalism in Evidence Law 
When a case is tried to a jury, jurors, litigants, and judges play 
roles not unlike the role of consumer, advertiser, and government in 
commercial speech cases.  When the parties to the litigation wish to 
communicate their message to jurors, judges are asked to limit or 
restrict what the speaker should be permitted to say.  These 
limitations are justified in part by the legal system’s assessment of the 
capacity of the jury, and what will be best for them with respect to the 
evidence they receive.70 
 
 66 Id. at 866. 
 67 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  Central Hudson involved a challenge to a New York agency 
regulation that barred utilities from advertising to promote the use of electricity.  It 
remains the most completely articulated constitutional test for commercial speech.  
Part one of the four part Hudson test is whether the affected speech is non-
misleading and concerns a lawful activity.  If it fails on either prong, it receives no 
First Amendment protection.  Id. at 563, 566, n.9.  When speech passes this 
threshold, the next three parts of the Hudson test come into play.  Together, they 
require the government to show a substantial interest to be served by its restriction 
on commercial speech (part two), the restriction directly advances the underlying 
government interest (part three), and is no more extensive than necessary to further 
it (part four).  Id. at 563-64, 566; see also Langvardt, supra note 62, at 599-601. 
 68 Halberstam, supra note 62, at 857. 
 69 See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. 
L. REV. 334, 335 (1991). 
 70 There are, of course, many differences between restrictions of commercial 
speech and restrictions of testimony.  One might note, for example, that rarely does 
the judge act on her own.  Rather, restrictions only occur when the opposing party 
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This raises the question of how to determine what is best, or to 
put the question a different way, “best” with what end in view?  Here 
one must make a fundamental choice.  If the reader disagrees with 
the next paragraph, he or she may question much of what follows.  I 
return to this point in Section IV. 
The primary goal in the view of the law of evidence, and of the 
trial itself, is to uncover the truth.  Ronald Allen and Brian Leiter 
argue: 
it is striking and important that the vast majority of the rules of 
evidence have as their primary rationale their (alleged) truth-
conductive virtues.  Competency of witnesses, authentication of 
evidence, relevancy, expert testimony, and hearsay (including the 
exceptions) all, at bottom, rest on the thought that inclusion and 
exclusion of evidence in line with these rules will increase the 
frequency with which truth is ascertained.71 
Other non-evidentiary rules governing jury behavior appear to be 
motivated by the same consideration.  These rules include, for 
example, the prohibition of note-taking and pre-deliberation 
discussion of the case by the jury.72 
If ascertaining the truth is the primary goal of a trial, a central 
question becomes what evidence should one consider in order to 
maximize the likelihood of arriving at a correct answer?  Alvin 
Goldman notes that, in the philosophy of science, a popular 
 
asks for them.  In this sense the judge may be more passive than the legislature.  We 
should not overemphasize this distinction, however.  It is rare for either courts or 
legislatures to act sua sponte. 
 71 Ronald Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1491, 1501 (2001). 
More formally, Federal Rule of Evidence section 102 lists the ascertainment of 
truth as one of the Rules’ primary objectives: 
Rule 102. Purpose and Construction: 
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, 
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of 
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the 
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. 
FED. R. EVID. 102.  As the rule suggests, however, ascertaining the truth is not the sole 
objective of the rules. 
Commentators vary widely in the belief that the search for truth is the primary 
goal of trials or the primary function of the jury.  Compare Franklin Strier, Making Jury 
Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95 (1996), with Mark Cammack, In Search of 
the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405 (1995).  In addition, see Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, The Worst Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis as to the Logical Structure 
of Evidence Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1992), for a useful discussion of “jury 
control” and “best evidence” explanations of the structure of evidence law. 
 72 See Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of 
Adversarial Processes, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 385 (1998). 
 896 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:881 
epistemological answer to this question is that an individual should 
base his judgments and subjective probabilities on the total evidence 
available.  Therefore, when confronted with a decision, individuals 
should use all available evidence that can be collected and used at a 
reasonable cost.73  He calls this the “requirement of total evidence.”74  
When the evidence that might be made available to the individual is 
under the control of another, a corollary of this requirement is that 
the other person should make available to the individual all of the 
evidence relevant to the question at hand.  Goldman calls this the 
control version of the requirement of total evidence.75  In the present 
context, this control version argues that judges should not impose 
admissibility rules that keep relevant, but relatively unreliable, 
evidence from juries.76 
Goldman argues, however, that the legal system’s failure to 
adopt a control version of the requirement of total evidence is not 
necessarily unwise, because such a rule may not produce the most 
accurate results if jurors give too much weight to relatively unreliable 
evidence.77  To the degree this is so, an admissibility rule that 
excludes such evidence may be justified on the grounds of what 
Goldman calls “epistemic paternalism.”  “The general idea is that the 
indicated rules of evidence are designed to protect jurors from their 
own ‘folly,’ just as parents might keep dangerous toys or other articles 
away from children, or might not expose them to certain facts.”78  For 
example, Rule 403 permits the exclusion of evidence that is relevant 
if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
 
 73 Alvin Goldman, Epistemic Paternalism: Communication Control in Law and Society, 
88 J. OF PHILOSOPHY 113 (1991). 
 74 For a justification of this rule, see PAUL HORWICH, PROBABILITY AND EVIDENCE 
(1982).  Goldman notes that there may be a number of non-epistemological grounds 
for excluding some evidence, for example, if collecting the evidence invades the 
privacy rights of some individual.  Goldman, supra note 73, at 114. 
 75 Goldman, supra note 73, at 114.  Again, Goldman notes there may be many 
non-epistemic reasons for excluding testimony, for example, that it is the result of an 
illegal search and seizure. 
 76 Evidence that is completely unreliable is, by definition, irrelevant.  That is, it 
cannot alter the probability that some fact is more or less likely.  An evidentiary 
restriction that admits only relevant evidence does not, therefore, violate the 
requirement of total evidence as it is ordinarily understood.  See Goldman, supra note 
73, at 113 n.2. 
 77 See Richard Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977). 
 78 Goldman, supra note 73, at 118.  Specific empirical examples of situations 
where restricting information to jurors lead to more accurate conclusions are rare.  
But see Dale Nance & Scott Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for 
Trace Evidence With a Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability, 42 
JURIMETRICS J. 403, 442-44 (2002). 
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unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”  As 
Brian Leiter describes the issue: 
Epistemic paternalism substitutes the rulemaker’s judgment 
about what is epistemically best for agents for their own 
judgment.  Assuming that the primary epistemic value is truth, 
epistemic paternalism entails designing rules of evidence that are 
epistemically best for jurors, i.e. that lead them to form true 
beliefs about disputed matters of fact.79 
Goldman admits that a paternalistic concern for the “welfare” of 
jurors is a bit odd.  If we focus solely on the well-being of jurors 
themselves, the paternalistic impulses in the law of evidence seem 
almost trivial.  Paternalism is generally thought of as an intervention 
in a person’s freedom aimed at furthering his own good.  The good 
to be achieved here, however, is not central to the well-being of the 
individual juror.  Indeed, one might say that the intervention is not 
paternalistic at all, if by the term we only mean that the court is 
operating in a manner contrary to the jury’s preferences.  It might 
well be that were we to ask jurors many would say, “Sure, keep the 
unreliable evidence from me.  I do not choose to be bothered by it.” 
However, Donald VanDeVeer proposes a second definition of 
paternalistic behavior that, comes closer to describing what courts do, 
and closer to what legislatures say they are doing when they restrict 
commercial speech.  By this definition, an act is also paternalistic 
when one deliberately acts to shape another’s preferences in ways 
that bypass the other’s capacity to resist.80  Keeping people from 
information that they never knew to exist may be paternalistic in this 
sense.  Moreover, the apparently trivial nature of admissibility 
paternalism disappears if we agree with Gerald Dworkin81 and John 
Kleinig82 that paternalism exists even when the class of persons whose 
good is involved is not the same as the class of persons whose 
freedom is restricted.  Requiring medical doctors to be licensed or 
restricting the ability of individuals to obtain drugs without a 
prescription are paternalistic in this sense.  They are designed not to 
protect physicians or drug manufacturers, rather they are intended to 
protect consumers.83  Admissibility restrictions that are justified 
 
 79 Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science 
Would Not Make For Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 814 (1997). 
 80 DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS ON 
BENEVOLENCE 19 (1986). 
 81 Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107, 110 (Richard A. 
Wassertrom ed., 1971). 
 82 JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 11 (1983). 
 83 Dworkin calls these examples of “impure” paternalism.  Dworkin, supra note 
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because they are best for the parties to the litigation, or for the legal 
system itself, are paternalistic in the same way.84 
Thus far, the issues have been presented as if they simply involve 
the ability of individual jurors.  However, the acquisition of 
knowledge has a social as well as an individual dimension.  As Alvin 
Goldman notes, we should be concerned not only with individual 
knowers but also with the social processes and practices which 
inculcate belief.85  The individual ability of the juror must be 
understood within the context of the trial and the way in which 
evidence is typically presented to the factfinder.  From this wider 
perspective, Goldman suggests five factors when considering the 
effect of paternalistic rules on decisions, that are relevant to whether 
paternalistic communication control policies will lead to veritistic 
outcomes.86  They are as follows: 1) the characteristics of the 
audience; 2) the characteristics of the speakers; 3) the characteristics 
of the controller (or gatekeeper); 4) the controller’s criterion of 
selection among speakers or messages; and 5) the availability of other 
alternate channels of communication that address the same topic.87 
It is a relatively straightforward undertaking to apply Goldman’s 
factors to the admissibility of expert testimony.  For example, a 
number of Goldman’s considerations relate to arguments advanced 
in Kuhn.  Characteristics of the audience (jurors) and the speakers 
(the experts) relate to Kuhn’s first three arguments: 1) jurors are 
relatively unconfused by expert testimony that does not involve a 
“technique” such as a lie detector; 2) jurors are less confused by 
testimony based on an expert’s own investigations than they are by 
testimony based on the investigations of other researchers; and 3) 
jurors are less confused by inductive reasoning than by deductive 
reasoning.  Characteristics of the controller (the judge), and the 
 
81, at 22. 
 84 Goldman, supra note 73, at 119. 
 85 ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 4-5 (1999). Goldman is a 
leading advocate of “naturalized epistemology,” an approach to knowledge that 
wishes to craft norms to guide our acquisition of knowledge based in large part on 
empirical information about how the human cognitive apparatus works.  His 
perspective has a strong social dimension.  Social epistemology focuses on social 
paths or routes to knowledge, examines the spread of information (or 
misinformation) across groups, and may consider collective or corporate entities 
such as juries or legislatures to be the relevant unit of analysis.  The core 
commitment of naturalized epistemology is methodological: an examination of the 
social mechanisms and practices that inculcate belief.  See Allen & Leiter, supra note 
71. 
 86 Goldman, supra note 73, at 124. 
 87 Id.  I have rearranged the order in which Goldman discusses the variables. 
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controller’s criterion of selection, relate to Kuhn’s fourth argument: 
judges are no better than jurors in assessing the merits of a scientific 
argument.  The availability of alternative channels touches on Kuhn’s 
fifth argument: cross-examination, competing experts, and judicial 
instructions are adequate to the task of clearing up any residual jury 
confusion. 
The Kuhn opinion cites no research as authority for its assertion 
about the abilities of judges and juries.  In this regard, however, Kuhn 
is no different from most opinions.  The next Section discusses what 
evidence we have in support of Kuhn’s view, or the opposite view that 
restrictions on the admissibility of expert evidence may improve 
outcome accuracy. 
The reader should be warned, however, that the existing 
research rarely addresses the exact questions for which we need 
answers.  There is no research that addresses the ultimate question of 
whether, in the aggregate, cases are more frequently decided 
correctly under various admissibility regimes.  This does not mean 
the research results are irrelevant, for even if they do not answer the 
ultimate question, they do narrow the range of reasonable 
disagreement. 
IV.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE RELATING TO PATERNALISTIC ARGUMENTS 
Although there are many ways one might organize the research 
relevant to the paternalistic argument, this article employs Goldman’s 
five factors as a template.88 
A.  The Characteristics of the Audience 
The heart of the argument for restrictions turns on the 
characteristics of the audience, that is the jurors.  As Goldman and 
others recognize, these characteristics are shaped not only by 
qualities that individuals bring to the courthouse, e.g. their 
educational attainment, demographic characteristics, and life 
experiences, but also by the forum itself.  They are not simply a set of 
individuals, rather they are a jury.  As a jury, they are constrained in 
many ways.  They cannot go to the library at night to do independent 
reading on a topic in the trial.  They cannot ask the parties for a 
standard textbook that they might examine.  In most jurisdictions, 
they cannot even ask for clarification of ambiguous points.  As Mirjan 
Damaska notes “jurors have no proof initiative and are usually not 
even permitted to ask questions of witnesses.  While evidence is being 
 
 88 Id. at 124.  I have rearranged the order in which Goldman discusses the factors. 
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adduced, they sit silent, cast—one might say—into the role of potted 
courtroom plants.”89  Therefore, while research on the abilities of 
individuals is of some relevance,90 better evidence on the 
characteristics of the audience must come from research about 
people placed in the role of a juror.91 
If there is one universal finding in jury research, it is that juries 
take their job very seriously.  If they fail to arrive at appropriate 
results, normally it is not due to a lack of effort.92  Shortcomings, 
therefore, are best thought of as caused by some combination of lack 
of ability among jury members and by the way in which the jury 
receives information. 
The literature on jury performance in general is voluminous.93  I 
focus on articles that at least tangentially touch on issues related to 
expert witnesses.  In this regard, it may be helpful to break the 
 
 89 MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 90 (1997).  Recent efforts in Arizona 
and elsewhere to empower jurors are slowly changing this pattern.  See Nancy 
Marder, Juries and Technology: Equipping Jurors for the Twenty-First Century, 66 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1257 (2001); see also Paula L. Hanaford et al., Permitting Jury Discussions During 
Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform, 24 L. & HUMAN. BEHAV. 359 (2000); Larry Heuer & 
Steven Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, 18 L. & HUMAN 
BEHAV. 121 (1994). 
 90 In the survey context, the public often expresses views contrary to those held 
by experts.  For an example of this phenomenon, see Nancy Kraus et al., Intuitive 
Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of Chemical Risk, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 215 (1992), 
reporting on expert and lay opinions regarding a number of matters concerning risk.  
One question asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
following statement: 
Residents of a small community (30,000 people) observed that several 
malformed children had been born there during each of the past few 
years.  The town is in a region where agricultural pesticides have been 
used during the past decade.  It is very likely that these pesticides were 
the cause of the malformations? 
Id. at 221.  The results were as follows: among toxicologists only 5% agreed, while 
48% of lay people agreed.  Id. 
 91 Even within the area of jury research, there is wide variation in the quality of a 
study design.  Most jury research is done in the laboratory and ranges from full 
blown trial simulations to paper and pencil exercises conducted with college 
sophomore subjects.  Generally, the more realistic the simulation the more faith we 
may have that it captures the actual jury experience and, therefore, suffers from 
fewer external validity threats. 
 92 Exceptions to this rule include the very short deliberation of the jury in the 
O.J. Simpson criminal trial. 
 93 For useful discussions of jury research, see Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black 
Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us about Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: 
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137, 152 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Michael J. Saks, 
What do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1998); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An 
Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849 (1998); NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW 
JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2000). 
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research into two parts: first, the ability of juries to deal with complex 
cases; and second, juries’ ability to assess expert testimony 
uninfluenced by other, non-epistemic factors that might affect 
judgment.94 
1.  The Jury and Complex Cases 
Evidence suggests that, while juries are competent in sorting out 
facts in simple cases,95 their ability in more complex cases is open to 
question.96  Complexity may arise due to the difficulty of the issues 
being considered, or due to the sheer volume of information the jury 
is asked to consider.97  Both types of complexity appear to give juries 
difficulty. 
Laboratory research reveals that mock jurors have trouble with 
statistical and probabilistic evidence and tend to underutilize 
statistical information in the sense that they fail to weigh it properly.98  
 
 94 These issues overlap in actual trials.  Cases which present complex factual 
questions inevitably are cases with expert witness testimony. 
 95 REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983); see also Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are 
Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 217-18 (1989); 
Vidmar, supra note 93, at 853-54. 
 96 See Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons From Civil 
Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 750-64 (1991); see also Richard Lempert, Civil Juries 
and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY 
SYSTEM 181 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL 117-30 
(1998). 
 97 The shear volume of information may make a case complex, or at least 
complicated.  A second dimension of complexity is the technical difficulty of the 
evidence.  The most “complex” trials are those that contain large quantities of 
various types of technical and scientific evidence.  However, even short trials that 
contain substantial amounts of technical, scientific, or statistical evidence may be 
difficult for lay persons.  Indeed, in such situations, a trial may be too short to convey 
a full understanding of the evidence.  Irwin Horowitz et al., The Effects of Complexity on 
Jurors’ Verdicts and Construction of Evidence, 86 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 641, 649 (2001), 
found that information load (the number of facts in the case) adversely affected 
simulated juries’ ability to sort out those facts having the greatest probative value. 
 98 See David L Faigman & A.J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes’ Theorem in the Trial Process: 
Instructing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1988); see 
also Brian C. Smith et al., Jurors’ Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 49 
(1996); Thompson & Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials, 
11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987); William C. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to 
Evaluate Statistical Evidence?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1989); Jane Goodman, 
Juror’s Comprehension and Assessment of Probabilistic Evidence, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 361 
(1992); Jonathan Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability in DNA Evidence: 
Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 425 (1995); Jason Schklar & Shari S. 
Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectations, 23 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 159 (1999); Nance & Morris, supra note 78.  In general, laypersons have 
difficulty applying statistical concepts to everyday behavior.  Richard Nisbett et al., 
Teaching Reasoning, 238 SCIENCE 625 (1987). 
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For example, in one study by Jane Goodman, jurors were asked to 
assess guilt of a defendant where his blood type was said to match that 
found at the crime scene.  Jurors in some versions of the experiment 
were told the blood type matched 5% of the people in town.99  In 
other versions, they were told it matched 1%, and in still other 
versions 0.1%.  A control group was provided no frequency 
information.100  The mean estimate of guilt was higher in groups that 
heard the probabilistic evidence.  However, the jurors’ estimates 
“failed to make fine distinctions between probability estimates that 
were mildly incriminating, moderately incriminating, and strongly 
incriminating.”101  Mock jurors with prior mathematical experience 
gave more weight to this evidence, lending some credence to the idea 
that juries comprised of more knowledgeable individuals, sometimes 
called “blue-ribbon” juries, would do better in complex cases.102 
Molly Treadway Johnson conducted a set of experiments 
examining the ability of members of a jury pool to make correct 
causal judgments based on their understanding of fictitious 
epidemiological studies.103  In one experiment, subjects were given a 
pair of two-by-two tables presenting typical epidemiological findings.  
In Table 1, there was a statistically significant association between 
exposure and disease where the relative risk was 2.8—indicating that 
if one is exposed, one has slightly less than three times as great a 
chance of having the disease than if one is not exposed.  In Table 2, 
the relationship was not statistically significant, the relative risk was 
1.01—indicating that if one is exposed one has a just slightly greater 
chance of having the disease than if one is not exposed (if the relative 
risk were 1.0, the likelihood of having the disease would be 
unaffected by exposure).  For each table, Johnson asked the 
following two questions: 
1) do the results of the study indicated that being exposed to 
[substance x] increases a person’s risk of developing [a certain 
abnormality], and 2) for any particular person who was exposed 
to [substance x] and now has [the abnormality], is it more likely 
than not that it was the [substance], rather than something else, 
that caused the [abnormality]?104 
 
 99 Goodman, supra note 98, at 361. 
 100 Id. at 369. 
 101 Id. at 372.  In the 5% condition, the mean estimate of guilt was 40%, in the 1% 
condition it was 45%, and in the 0.1% condition it was 47%.  Id. at 371. 
 102 Id. at 389. 
 103 Molly T. Johnson, An Investigation of Juror Comprehension of Statistical Proof 
of Causation (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with author). 
 104 Id. at 51. 
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Twenty-five respondents answered the question, so that there were a 
total of 100 possible correct answers (two “yes’s” for the first table and 
two “no’s” for the second table).  Altogether, the respondents gave 
forty-one correct answers; only two subjects answered all four 
questions correctly.105 
In this experiment, the subjects were unassisted in their task.  In 
a second experiment, some subjects viewed an eighteen-minute 
videotape of an epidemiologist explaining the tables and how 
epidemiologists analyze and interpret epidemiological data followed 
by jury instructions.106  A control group heard only the instructions.  
Surprisingly, subjects did about as well in this second experiment, 
and there was no statistically significant difference in the frequency of 
correct responses between the subjects who heard the expert 
testimony and those who did not.107 
Johnson conducted a third experiment in which Experiment I 
was replicated using college students rather than people from the 
local jury pool as subjects.  The college students did substantially 
better.108  Altogether, twenty-five college students gave sixty-four out 
of a possible 100 correct answers.109  Again, this result is consistent 
with other research indicating that the quality of jury performance 
depends, in part, on the abilities the jurors bring to their 
deliberations.  Both education and occupation are corollaries of juror 
competence.110 
 
 105 Id. at 54.  All ambiguous answers, e.g. “maybe,” were coded as incorrect.  Some 
people might argue that the “correct” answer to the second question for each Table 
is not obvious.  If we only consider answers to the first question for each Table, then 
out of fifty possible correct answers the respondents answered correctly twenty-three 
times.  Id. at 55.  Generally, respondents tended to answer “No” and the distribution 
of answers to the two Tables was nearly identical.  Id.  For Table 1 there were eight 
“yeses,” fourteen “noes,” and three “others.”  For Table 2 there were eight “yeses,” 
fifteen “noes,” and two “others.”  Id. 
 106 For an interesting study of how factors influence the odds that epidemiologists 
themselves will draw a causal inference based on epidemiological research, see C.D. 
Holman et al., A Psychometric Experiment in Causal Inference to Estimate Evidential Weights 
Used by Epidemiologists, 12 EPIDEMIOLOGY 246 (2001).  Factors with the strongest 
influence include: level of statistical significance, refutation of alternative 
explanations, strength of association, number of supporting studies, and information 
concerning biological and theoretical coherence. 
 107 Id. at 80. 
 108 This result is consistent with research that indicates training in statistics or 
economics improves statistical reasoning ability.  See Richard Nisbett et al., Teaching 
Reasoning, in RULES FOR REASONING (Richard Nisbett ed., 1993). 
 109 Johnson, supra note 103, at 94.  With respect to the first question for each 
table, the college students provided thirty-two out of fifty possible correct answers.  
Id. at 96. 
 110 See Fred Strodtbeck et al., Social Status in Jury Deliberations, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 713 
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It is important to note that the Johnson study did not involve a 
deliberation, and there is evidence that if some members of the jury 
are correct in their understanding of some piece of information they 
will be able to communicate it to other jurors.  On the other hand, 
the Johnson study does suggest that evidence from a relatively simple 
epidemiological study may be “complex” in the eyes of many jurors. 
Irwin Horowitz, Lynn Forester Lee, and Ian Brolly examined 
complexity in a setting where jury-eligible adults saw a videotape of a 
complex civil trial.111  The experiment varied both the information 
load (the quantity of evidence to be processed) and the complexity 
(comprehensibility), of the testimony of the witnesses.  These two 
dimensions paralleled the trial length and scientific complexity 
dimensions of other studies.  Horowitz, et al. manipulated 
information load by varying the number of plaintiffs and witnesses 
who testified.  They found that high information load negatively 
affected juror evaluation of liability.  Jurors were less able to 
distinguish effectively among differentially liable plaintiffs.112 
The results of these experiments are substantiated by survey data 
and by case studies of actual trials.  Daniel Shuman, et al. sent 
questionnaires to judges who presided over cases in which expert 
witnesses testified.  Only forty-seven percent rarely thought the expert 
testimony was too technical for jurors to understand.113  Self-reports 
by jurors also indicate that some, but not all, jurors report having 
trouble.  A Federal Judicial Center study reports that forty-six percent 
of jurors in long trials rated difficult or very difficult, although most 
said that they were able to comprehend the evidence.114 
Steven Austin interviewed jurors in a complex predatory pricing 
case under the Robinson-Patman Act.  He reports that the jurors were 
“overwhelmed, frustrated and, confused by testimony well beyond 
their comprehension.”115  Similarly, in another study, Steven 
Friedland describes several complex cases in which juries 
 
(1957); see also HASTIE ET AL., supra note 95. 
 111 Horowitz et al., supra note 97, at 757. 
 112 Id. at 764. 
 113 Daniel W. Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in 
the Courts–Part II: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 198 (1994). 
 114 Cecil et al., supra note 96, at 751-53.  The FJC research tends to equate 
complexity with trial length. 
 115 Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk From Complexity, The New Media, and 
Deviancy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 54 (1995).  Relevant to the issue of central versus 
peripheral processing discussed below, he noted that the jurors began to focus on 
how the lawyers were dressed and other such matters. 
 2003 THE MERITS OF PATERNALISTIC JUSTIFICATION 905 
experienced comprehension problems.116 
The Special Committee on Jury Comprehension of the 
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Litigation Section conducted an 
in-depth study of jury decision-making in four complex cases where 
complexity was a matter of both length and technical difficulty.117  In 
some of the cases, the jury reported it was able to sort out the 
evidence, but in others jurors told researchers they had trouble 
deciding claims because of the large volume of data.118 
Richard Lempert provided a useful discussion of actual jury 
behavior in complex cases based on a review of thirteen cases that 
could be considered complex either because of length or subject 
matter.119  Lempert used a three-point “defensibility scale” (high, 
moderate, and low) to rate each verdict on the merits.  The 
defensibility of the decision on the merits was rated as high in seven 
 
 116 Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 
85 NW. U. L. REV. 190 (1990). 
 117 SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON JURY COMPREHENSION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
SECTION OF LITIGATION, JURY COMPREHENSION IN COMPLEX CASES (1989) [hereinafter 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE].  The cases involved antitrust, sexual harassment, 
misappropriation of trade secrets, and insurance fraud.  Id. at 9-23.  Although the 
researchers could not tape the actual jurors in the cases, they did tape simultaneous 
alternate jury deliberations with the objective of gaining some insight into what 
happened in the real jury deliberations.  Unfortunately for the researchers, but 
revealing in its own right, in three of the four cases the alternate jury reached a 
different verdict than the actual jury.  Id. at 59. 
 118 Id. at 25-26. 
 119 Lempert, supra note 96, at 181.  Cases 1-4 were part of the ABA study: (1) 
sexual harassment, (2) antitrust, (3) insurance fraud related to an arson, and (4) 
misappropriation of trade secrets.  The research was conducted by Elizabeth Loftus, 
Jane Goodman, and Edith Green.  Case 5 reports on the famous Pennzoil v. Texaco 
case which involved a tortuous interference with contract.  Stephen Adler, How to 
Lose the Bet-Your-Company Case, AM. LAW. 27-30, 107-10 (Jan./Feb. 1986).  Cases 6 and 
7 are the trial and retrial of the antitrust case, Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric 
Illuminating Co., studied by Austin.  See ARTHUR AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 
CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY (1984).  Cases 8-11 are reports of notable 
trials in The American Lawyer by a number of different authors.  Case 8, Stephen 
Brill, Inside the DeLorean Jury Room, AM. LAW. 94-105. (Dec. 1984), reviews the criminal 
conspiracy trial of John DeLorean.  Case 9, Allison Frankel, He Bombed as a Stool 
Pigeon, AM. LAW. 35-89. (May 1989), discusses United States v. GAF Corp., a stock 
manipulation case. Case 10 Gay Jervey, Charlie Keating, Meet Your Peers, AM. LAW. 101-
09. (March 1992), reports on California v. Keating, the prosecution of Charles Keating 
for stock fraud.  Case 11, Mitchell Pacelle, Contaminated Verdict, AM. LAW. 75-80 (Dec. 
1986), writes about a toxic tort case against W.R. Grace & Co and Beatrice Corp. for 
leukemia allegedly caused by their dumping toxic substances that seeped into the 
ground water used as drinking water by plaintiffs.  Case 12 is a Rand report of an 
asbestos case.  MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PINKUS, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE: 
OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE (1987).  Case 13, Claudia Weinstein, 
Losing Big in Computer Land, AM. LAW. 123-30 (Oct. 1983), discusses Micro/Vest v 
Computerland Corp., a breach of contract case. 
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cases, moderate in four cases, and low in two cases. 
In an attempt to separate cases that are ““complex” because of 
their subject matter, Lempert rates each case according to his own 
sense of the inherent difficulty of the evidence, once again on a three 
point scale: high, moderate, and low.120  Of the six cases scored low on 
inherent difficulty, four juries reached highly-defensible verdicts and 
two reached moderately-defensible verdicts.  Of the seven trials rated 
moderate or high on difficulty, three juries reached highly defensible 
verdicts, two reached moderately defensible verdicts, and two scored 
low on defensibility.  The one jury for which the evidence difficulty 
was rated high, but whose verdict on the merits was rated as highly 
defensible, found damage amounts that Lempert rated low on 
defensibility.  Overall, one can conclude from this study that jury 
performance is more likely to be a problem in those cases that are 
“complex” because of the technical nature of the evidence. 
I reached a similar conclusion after interviewing jurors about the 
testimony in a complex evidence case involving the drug Bendectin.  
I concluded that the jurors had a weak grasp of the science resulting 
in an indefensible verdict.121 
These studies are consistent with the observation of Joe Cecil 
and his colleagues, that the most difficult type of complex evidence is 
that containing statistical and technical information.122  There is some 
research to support the suggestion that the difficulty jurors have in 
assigning appropriate weight to this evidence is exacerbated when the 
evidence is of low probative value, that is when it does not change the 
probability of a causal relationship by very much.123 
 
 120 A case was scored high on difficulty “where a large amount of hard to 
understand, unfamiliar scientific information bore on the central issue in the case.”  
Lempart, supra note 119, at 189.  It was scored moderate or low where “technical or 
specialized information seemed somewhat easier to understand or where full 
understanding seemed less crucial to correct decision making, because the evidence 
was not so central, or because it was redundant with other easier to understand 
evidence or because vaguer understanding would suffice.”  Id. 
 121 Joseph Sanders, The Jury Deliberation in a Complex Case: Havner v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 45 (1993). 
 122 See Cecil et al., supra note 96, at 757-58 (1991).  See, e.g., Thompson & 
Schumann, supra note 98, at 167; Thompson, supra note 98, at 9. 
 123 See Paul Slovic et al., What Should We Know About Making Risk Comparisons?, 10 
RISK ANALYSIS 389 (1990); see also Brandon B. Johnson, Stability and Inoculation of Risk 
Comparisons’ Effects Under Conflict: Replicating and Extending the “Asbestos Jury” Study by 
Slovic et al., 22 RISK ANALYSIS 777 (2002).  A similar finding indicates the differences 
in low probabilities has little impact on decisions.  Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: 
Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 71-73 (2002); see also W. Kip Viscusi, 
Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2001).  
The ability to assess risk is further eroded in situations that are emotionally highly 
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An examination of the cases Lempert scored as “high” on 
difficulty reveals that when confronted with complex technical and 
scientific evidence from competing experts, jurors have a difficult 
time assessing the merits of the testimony.124  Jurors are often 
confronted with a “battle of the experts,” each of whom is chosen for 
the ability to be convincing and appear credible.125  This point leads 
to the second body of data that directly addresses how juries respond 
to experts. 
2.  The Jury and Expert Witnesses 
It is a common misperception that juries are overwhelmed by 
experts simply because they are experts.126  The ABA study found, for 
example, that the jurors in their four cases were not overly impressed 
with the experts, and dismissed many of them as “hired guns.”127  In 
fact, the Committee concluded that a witness who is perceived to be a 
“hired gun” can do positive harm to a party’s case.128 
 
charged.  See Reid Hastie, Emotions in Juror’s Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 991 (2001) 
(summarizing the relevant psychology literature). 
 124 The three were the ABA trade secrets case, the asbestos exposure case, and the 
ground water contamination case.  Pacelle, supra note 199, at 75-80; SELVIN & PINKUS, 
supra note 119, at 4. 
 125 See Anthony Champagne et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert 
Witnesses in American Courts, 4 JURIMETRICS J. 375 (1991); see also Samuel Gross, Expert 
Evidence, 1991 WISC. L. REV. 1113 (1991). 
 126 One might be tempted to conclude, as apparently the Kuhn court did, that if a 
jury is not overwhelmed by a piece of testimony there is no need for a reliability 
filter.  This does not logically follow.  A hypothetical example may help to 
demonstrate this point.  Assume that the reliability of expert evidence could be 
measured on a scale of one to ten, with the most reliable evidence scored ten.  Also 
assume the jury is presented with a piece of evidence with a score of one on our 
reliability scale.  If jurors are overwhelmed by all expert testimony, this would mean, 
one presumes, that they would believe that this evidence is much more reliable, say 
eight on our scale.  Clearly, this would cause them to mis-estimate the evidentiary 
value of the evidence.  Moreover, if jurors were routinely overwhelmed by all expert 
testimony, they could make no distinctions between any evidence.  Evidence with a 
score of four on our hypothetical reliability scale would be considered as good as 
evidence actually scoring an eight and no better that the evidence with a score of 
one.  However, even if jurors are not overwhelmed, this does not mean they will 
properly weigh the reliability of evidence.  They might simply disregard all expert 
evidence, effectively giving it a reliability score of one, or they could give all evidence 
a five, and thus still fail to distinguish between evidence scoring eight, evidence 
scoring four, and evidence scoring one. 
 127 SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 117, at 40.  This finding agrees with other 
research on the impact of experts.  See studies summarized in Neil Vidmar, “Assessing 
the Impact of Statistical Evidence, A Social Science Perspective,” in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF 
STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 279 (Stephen Fienberg ed., 
1989). 
 128 SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 117, at 42; see also Scott Sundby, The Jury as 
 908 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:881 
Daniel Shuman and his colleagues conducted a group of studies 
and concluded that jurors do not mechanically defer to experts 
because of their expertise.  Rather, they are far more skeptical in 
their assessments.129 
Molly Selvin and Larry Pinkus report a general skepticism, if not 
a negative disposition, by jurors toward the experts in the asbestos 
case.130  Apparently, a frequent jury response to difficult scientific 
issues is to downplay the importance of the experts and their 
testimony.  For example, Shari Diamond and Jonathan Casper, 
reporting on a laboratory study of jury decision-making in a complex 
antitrust case, noted that “lack of clarity, that is, perceived complexity 
and difficulty, discourages the jurors from accepting an expert’s 
position, rather than inducing them to accept it.”131  Mitchell Pacelle’s 
report of the ground water contamination case suggests that jurors 
answered some questions with little reference to the science 
introduced to address the issue.132  Perhaps the clearest statement of 
this view is to be found in the following comment made by a juror in 
an asbestos case studied by Goodman, Green, and Loftus: “[t]he 
expert testimony was not a real factor in our decision, except in the 
very backhanded sense that it lent medical credence to any result.”133 
The evidence that jurors do not overrate experts does not mean 
that jurors always understand experts.  In the face of difficult, 
conflicting expert testimony, jurors have three options.  First, as the 
quote above suggests, is simply to disregard the testimony and decide 
the case on other grounds.  Second, is to slog through the testimony 
and assess the testimony on the merits.  Third, is to rely on other 
indicia of whom to believe.  Determining when individuals will 
choose between the second and third alternatives is the subject of a 
 
Critic: An Eempirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony. 83 VA. 
L. REV. 1109 (1997) (providing a concurring opinion). 
 129 Daniel Shuman & Anthony Champagne, Removing the People from the Legal 
Process: The Rhetoric and Research on Judicial Selection and Juries, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
LAW 242, 258 (1997). 
In a valuable article published too late for me to include, Ivkovic and Hans 
discuss juror evaluations of experts in seven cases.  Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic & Valerie P. 
Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 441 (2003). 
 130 SELVIN & PINKUS, supra note 119, at 77. 
 131 Shari Diamond & Jonathan Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: 
Damages, Experts and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 513, 543 (1992). 
 132 Mitchell Pacelle, Contaminated Verdict, AM. LAW. 75, 80 (Dec. 1986). 
 133 Jane Goodman et al., What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases, TRIAL 65, 68 (Nov. 
1985); see also Sanja Ivkovich & Valerie Hans, Jurors and Experts, 16 ADVOCATE: THE 
MAGAZINE FOR DELAWARE TRIAL LAWYERS 17 (1994). 
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body of research on decision making in settings that involve 
persuasion attempts.  This research indicates that people employ two 
basic cognitive processes to assist them in decision making: central 
processing and peripheral processing.134 
In central or systematic processing, people examine the content 
of a communication to assess its validity.  Persuasion is primarily a 
function of the quality of the arguments presented.135  In peripheral 
or heuristic processing, people do not attend to the quality and 
validity of arguments.  Rather, they adopt shortcuts to determine the 
value of a message.  People rely on factors such as the number of 
arguments (rather than their quality), the attractiveness of the 
communicator, and the communicator’s credentials. 
Joel Cooper, Elizabeth Bennett, and Holly Sukel conducted a 
laboratory experiment on the effects of trial complexity on juror 
assessment of expert testimony in a laboratory setting.136  The subjects 
viewed a one-hour videotape of a civil case involving a person who 
claimed that exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) caused 
his cancer.  In the video, the defendant conceded that the plaintiff 
had been exposed, thus the only factual issue was whether the 
exposure caused the illness.137  The evidence on this question was 
presented by two expert witnesses, one for each side.  The 
experiment manipulated the linguistic complexity of the testimony of 
one of the experts.138  The experiment also manipulated the expert’s 
 
 134 See Alice Eagly & Shelly Chaiken, Attitude Structure and Function, in 1 HANDBOOK 
OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 269 (Daniel Gilbert et al. eds., 1998); see also Richard Petty & Duane 
Wegener, Attitude Change: Multiple Roles for Persuasion Variables, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 323 (Daniel Gilbert et al. eds., 1998); RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. 
CACIOPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO 
ATTITUDE CHANGE (1986); Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information 
Processing and the Use of Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERS. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 752 (1980). 
 135 Joel Cooper et al., Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make Decisions?, 20 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 379, 381 (1996). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 384. 
 138 For example, in the low complexity condition the expert made statements such 
as this: “In the rats and mice, PCBs caused not only liver disease but also cancer of 
the liver.  In additional [sic] to the liver damages, [the study] found diseases of the 
immune system as well.”  Id. at 385.  In the high complexity condition, the expert 
made statements such as this: “[The study] reported tumor induction in rats and 
mice.  [The study] also reported that not only rats and mice, but in monkeys as well, 
there was hepatomegaly, hepatomegalocytosis and lymphoid atrophy in both spleen 
and thymus.”  Id.  The testimony of the other expert was “complex” in all conditions.  
Id.  The manipulation of linguistic complexity rather than actual scientific or 
technical complexity is a shortcoming of this study.  In actual trials, experts are 
coached to reduce their arguments to simple terms that can be understood by lay 
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credentials.139  In the high complexity condition, ninety-one percent 
of the jurors voted for the plaintiff when the case was presented by an 
expert with high credentials, but only sixty-four percent of the jurors 
voted for the plaintiff when the case was presented by an expert with 
low credentials.  This difference is statistically significant.140  In the 
low-complexity condition, the effect of expert credentials was not 
significant.  However, jurors were more likely to vote for the plaintiff 
when the testimony was presented by the expert with low credentials, 
and there was a significant interaction between the level of 
complexity and the strength of credentials.141  This interaction was 
also significant when the jurors were asked to estimate the probability 
that PCBs were the cause of the plaintiff’s illness.142  In the high-
complexity case, jurors who heard the highly-credentialed expert 
concluded, on average, that there was a ninety-six percent probability 
that the PCBs caused the cancer.  On the other hand, jurors who 
heard the low credentialed expert concluded, on average, that it was 
only forty-nine percent probable that this was the case.143 
In a second article, Joel Cooper and Isaak Neuhaus reported 
three experiments that assessed the effect of high pay and frequent 
testifying on jury judgments of experts at trial.144  In the first 
experiment, a highly credentialed expert who was paid $4,800 a day 
had less influence on jurors than either an expert who was paid less, 
an expert with lesser credentials, or both.  A second experiment 
 
people.  Thus, the circumstances of this manipulation are unlikely to occur in actual 
trials.  The study is also limited by the fact that the “jurors” did not deliberate. 
 139 In the “high” condition, the expert had advanced degrees from highly 
prestigious universities, was currently teaching and conducting research at a similar 
institution, and had published many articles on cancer in peer-reviewed journals.  In 
the “low” condition, the expert received a degree from a relatively obscure 
institution, taught at a large state university, and had published far fewer articles.  
Subjects perceived the individual with high credentials to have more expertise.  
Cooper et al., supra note 135, at 386. 
 140 Id. at 387. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 388. 
 143 Id.  Vidmar and Diamond challenge Cooper’s interpretation of this result.  
Neil Vidmar & Shari S. Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 
1154-55 (2001).  They note that the Cooper study tested juror comprehension of the 
testimony and jurors in all four experimental conditions indicated good 
comprehension.  They argue that the strong and consistent performance on 
comprehension is important because it suggests that jurors centrally processed the 
testimony and did not rely simply on the more impressive educational and 
professional background of the highly credentialed expert. 
 144 Joel Cooper & Isaak M. Neuhaus, The “Hired Gun” Effect: Assessing the Effect of 
Pay, Frequency of Testifying, and Credentials on the Perception of Expert Testimony, 24 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 149 (2000). 
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manipulated the rate of pay and expert witness testifying experience 
independently.  The highly paid expert was found to be less 
persuasive when he also had a substantial history of testifying.  In a 
third experiment, Cooper and Neuhaus manipulated expert pay and 
the complexity of the expert’s language.  All the experts used in this 
study were experienced and highly credentialed.  Again, there was an 
interaction effect.  The expert using highly complex language and 
paid the top rate was less persuasive than the experts in the other 
conditions (less complex testimony and/or paid less).  The jury also 
saw this expert as the least honest.  Cooper and Neuhaus concluded 
that experts who are highly paid and who testify frequently are 
perceived as hired guns who are neither liked nor believed.145  As in 
their earlier study, Cooper and Neuhaus interpret these results as 
supporting the shift to peripheral processing when faced with 
complex, cognitively challenging testimony. 
As they did with respect to Cooper’s earlier study, Vidmar and 
Diamond question whether these results are best explained as an 
example of peripheral processing.146  They argue that a competing 
explanation is that the jurors centrally processed the testimony, but 
rejected it when the expert’s motives were suspect.  Vidmar and 
Diamond’s disagreement with the Cooper and Neuhaus 
interpretation does highlight two facts.  First, central processing and 
peripheral processing are not mutually exclusive methods of 
thinking.  Juries, like other decision makers, may engage in a 
combination of central and peripheral strategies when making up 
their mind.147  Indeed, the competing explanation offered by Vidmar 
and Diamond suggest just such a process.  Jurors may have attempted 
to centrally process the expert testimony, but discounted the 
testimony of some experts based on the peripheral information that 
they were highly paid and, therefore, their motive was suspect. 
Second, peripheral processing can be a better or worse decision 
making strategy depending on the peripheral cues used to come to a 
decision because some cues are better indicia of reliability than 
others.  For example, the first Cooper and Neuhaus study argued that 
an expert’s credentials counted as a positive factor in assessing the 
 
 145 Id. 
 146 Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 143, at 1156 (2001). 
 147 For example, Greenberg and Wursten found that simulated jurors were 
influenced more by medical expert testimony than by psychological expert testimony 
even when the testimony presented by the experts was identical in form and 
complexity.  J. Greenberg & A. Wursten, The Psychologist and the Psychiatrist as Expert 
Witnesses: Perceived Credibility and Influence, 19 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 373 
(1988). 
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validity of their argument whereas in the second study, the 
comparatively excessive compensation paid to the expert acted as a 
negative factor.  Most students of expert testimony would predict that 
within a given case, differences in credentials and fees are a weak 
predictor of validity.  However, they may believe other cues are even 
worse, e.g. the gender of the expert. 
On the other hand, they might believe that other factors such as 
the Daubert factors of general acceptance, and peer review and 
publication are better because they are more probative as to the 
reliability of expert testimony.  In fact, as the following study indicates 
there is some research indicating that jurors may use this type of 
peripheral information as well. 
In a laboratory experiment using undergraduate subjects to 
examine “juror” reasoning skills about the scientific validity of expert 
evidence in a gender discrimination case, Margaret Kovera and her 
colleagues manipulated four variables.148  The first manipulation 
involved the publication status of the underlying research that 
formed the basis of the expert’s testimony.  Some jurors heard that 
the research had been published in a peer-reviewed journal and had 
been cited in major psychology texts while other jurors heard the 
research had been submitted for publication, but not published or 
cited.  In a second manipulation, “ecological validity” was 
manipulated.149  Some jurors heard that the subjects in the underlying 
study had been college students and others that they had been blue 
collar employees in a company similar to the defendant company.  A 
third manipulation involved the “construct validity” of the underlying 
study.150  Some jurors heard that there was but a single measure of 
sexual harassment while others heard that there were multiple 
measures.  A fourth manipulation varied the quality of the cross-
examination.  In the scientifically uninformed version, the cross was 
restricted to general questions such as whether the expert was 
qualified to make a legal determination regarding the occurrence of 
sexual harassment.  In the informed version, the cross drew attention 
 
 148 Margaret B. Kovera et al., Reasoning About Scientific Evidence: Effects of Juror 
Gender and Evidence Quality on Juror Decisions in a Hostile Work Environment Case, 84 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 362 (1999). 
 149 Ecological validity is a species of external validity.  External validity involves the 
ability to generalize conclusions to particular persons, settings, and times and to types 
of persons, settings, and times.  See THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-
EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN AND ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD TESTING 71 (1979). 
 150 Construct validity problems may arise when one has a single operationalization 
of a cause or an effect: a mono-operation bias.  More reliable research includes 
multiple operationalizations.  COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 149, at 67. 
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to the issues of ecological and construct validity. 
The subjects rated the expert evidence as more valid if it had 
been published.151  None of the other manipulations affected validity 
judgments, but the jurors did judge the expert as more credible if she 
studied the responses of individuals who resembled the plaintiff’s 
coworkers.152  Jurors were not sensitive to variations in the construct 
validity manipulation.  This was the case whether or not the jurors 
heard the scientifically sophisticated cross-examination.153 
In my judgment, the weight of the experimental research 
suggests that jurors do engage in peripheral processing when 
assessing expert testimony and that the peripheral cues take on 
added significance as the scientific issues in the case become more 
complex.154 
Trial lawyers tend to agree with at least the first part of this 
conclusion.  Sanders, Diamond, and Vidmar conducted two separate 
focus groups with groups of Texas trial lawyers who concentrate on 
products liability cases.155  One focus group was with plaintiff lawyers 
and one with defense counsel.  Defense lawyers expressed concerns 
about the impact of many personal factors on the effectiveness of 
expert testimony.  These factors included, inexperience on the 
stand,156 high fees,157 where the expert is from,158 presentation style,159 
and other personal factors.160  For example, one defense lawyer made 
the following comment: 
 
 151 Kovera et al., supra note 148, at 370. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 372. 
 154 See also Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific 
Expert Testimony on Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 267 (2002). 
 155 Joseph Sanders et al., Trial Lawyer Perceptions of Expert Knowledgethe Law 
and Society Association Meeting in Miami, Florida) (on file with author). 
 156 Transcript of Defense Lawyer Focus Group, at 43(March 1999) (on file with 
author). 
 157 Id. at 14, 26. 
 158 Id. at 25. 
 159 Id. at 6. 
 160 Id. at 57.  One lawyer commented on an expert who: 
is such a good doctor, he is so analytical, he lays the case out, he goes 
through the medical records with a fine tooth comb.  He gives you 
every variation, every theory, but the guy, I mean I hate to say it, he’s 
the most unattractive person in the world.  You just wouldn’t put him 
in front of the jury.  He’s got a bookish appearance and just an 
unattractive way, he talks in a monotone and just for all of those 
reasons, he as no appeal whatsoever as a jury expert but he’s probably 
the best analytical expert. 
Id. at 36. 
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I tried a case in Sierra Blanca, which is down on the Rio Grande 
River a little while back and you have to carefully pick your 
witnesses down there so that the jury can identify with them and 
get along with them and their manner of speech and their 
manner of presentation.161 
These comments reflect the attorneys’ perceptions that jurors are 
likely, perhaps more likely than a judge, to rely on peripheral rather 
than central processing in assessing the testimony of an expert. 
Some defense lawyers also expressed a concern that jurors may 
not understand the content of expert testimony in complex cases.  
One lawyer noted: 
We all settle cases that we strongly believe in the defense of a case 
from a technical standpoint because there is that lingering doubt 
that even though you’re able to hopefully translate the technical 
aspect, the medical aspect to the jury, there is still that lingering 
doubt that the emotional aspects of the case is going to 
overwhelm the jury’s ability to understand and process a complex 
case.162 
Plaintiff lawyers also discussed both the ability of jurors to 
properly discount extraneous factors and their ability to understand 
expert testimony.  They, too, were concerned about how an expert 
will appear before the court.  As one attorney noted, “there have 
been cases where somebody, after I met them, I said ‘you know, they 
are just not going to look too shiny and I need to go get a show dog 
and do a handoff.’”163  Generally, the lawyers agreed that if one has a 
bad witness, it is rarely worth the effort to send him to “charm 
school.”  One lawyer noted, however, that this is a more common 
practice on the defense side.  At an earlier point in his career, when 
he represented large corporations, the lawyer noted: 
it was not unusual at all to send an expert that’s being used 
nationwide to witness school in California and they became very 
polished.  They learned that when you answer a question you look 
at the jury when you answer it.  And they learned how you can 
occasionally slip something into your testimony and how to sound 
sincere.164 
 
 161 Transcript of Defense Lawyer Focus Group, at 6. 
 162 Id. at 73-74. 
 163 Transcript of Plaintiff Lawyer Focus Group, at 36. 
 164 Id. at 42.  These comments suggest that lawyers are concerned that jurors 
might be influenced by factors such as presentation style.  But when asked directly 
whether jurors can understand expert testimony, the plaintiff lawyers responded with 
an adamant “yes.”  A few comments provide a flavor of this fervor: “Around this table 
everybody will give you the same answer.  Yeah, we trust juries, we believe in juries 
even when they pour us out.”  Id. at 64.  (“Pour us out” is a Texas lawyer expression 
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There is one other body of research that addresses an issue 
similar to, but not quite the same as peripheral processing.  That is 
the tendency of jurors (and potentially other fact finders), to trade 
off the elements of a tort in arriving at a verdict.  For example, the 
jury may believe that the plaintiff’s causation argument is weak but 
that the defendant’s behavior was particularly egregious.  Considered 
together, the breach of duty “makes up for” the weak causal 
evidence.165  The evidence that this occurs comes in the form of 
experiments on bifurcation. 
Zeisel and Callahan conducted a field experiment on the effects 
of bifurcation of liability and damages in the Northern District of 
Illinois in the early 1960s.  They found that defendants prevailed in 
fifty-six percent of bifurcated trials, but in only thirty-four percent of 
unitary trials.166  In a laboratory experiment, Horowitz and Bordens 
found that juries hearing a unitary trial were significantly more likely 
to find for the plaintiff (85%) than were juries that heard bifurcated 
trials (68%).  This tendency was strongest when the bifurcated trial 
juries heard the general causation testimony first.  If these juries did 
find for the plaintiff, however, their compensatory damages awards 
were significantly larger.167 
Horowitz and Bordens used tape transcripts of their juries’ 
deliberations to explain these results.  Juries that heard bifurcated 
trials independently decided each element of the cause of action.  In 
 
for a jury defense verdict.)  “They have phenomenal ability to cut through the 
bullshit.”  Id. at 64. 
As with the opinions of defense attorneys, it is not easy to completely reconcile 
these statements about jury ability with a concern that the personal attributes of an 
expert may cause the rejection of an otherwise sound analysis.  Clearly, however, the 
plaintiff attorneys we spoke with view the abilities of juries more favorably than 
defense attorneys. 
 165 The tendency to make this tradeoff is partly the result of a heuristic of culpable 
causation, i.e., the tendency to weigh the causal impute of a factor more heavily if the 
factor is the result of moral blamewothiness.  For example, in one study a person is 
speeding home and collides with another car.  The driver of the second car is 
injured.  Study participants were asked to assess the degree to which the speeder’s 
driving causally contributed to the accident.  In one condition of the experiment the 
driver was speeding to hide an anniversary present before his spouse got home and 
in a second condition he was speeding to hide drugs.  Subjects assigned more 
causation to the person in the latter condition than the former condition even 
though the reason for speeding has no logical connection to the degree to which 
speeding caused the accident.  Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 368 (1992). 
 166 Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical 
Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1612 (1963). 
 167 Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of 
Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 277-78 (1990). 
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contrast, unitary juries failed to separate elements: 
[E]vidence for matters not directly related to the issue under 
consideration intruded on the decision-making process.  For 
example, when deciding general causation, unitary juries 
appeared to use aspects of the damages evidence.  At each 
decision point, juries searched in other areas, especially evidence 
concerning damages, to buttress their decisions.  This was evident 
when juries were faced with the most ambiguous trial issue, 
general causation . . . .  Separated trials are structured so that the 
reinterpretation of the general causation evidence is less likely 
because many of these juries do not hear damages evidence. . . .  
In fact, only 25% of the juries in the separated condition hearing 
only causation evidence . . . found for the plaintiffs, whereas 
87.5% of the unitary trial juries, which only decided causation 
(but heard all of the evidence), found for the plaintiffs.168 
Other jury experiments have generated similar results and 
researchers offer a similar interpretation.169 
Diamond and Vidmar note that reasoning skills that might 
improve jury performance can be taught.170  It is not clear, however, 
how jurors would be given these skills absent the use of a court 
appointed master or court appointed expert.  Under normal 
circumstances, jury errors are likely.  The question remains, of 
course, whether restrictive admissibility rules have any beneficial 
affect on the error rate.  The answer to that question turns in part on 
the evidence concerning the characteristics of the speakers 
(witnesses) and the characteristics of the controller (the judicial 
gatekeeper). 
B.  The Characteristics of the Speakers 
Juries do not hear cases in a vacuum.  The evidence comes from 
expert witnesses.  Their characteristics interact with those of jurors in 
affecting the likelihood that jurors will arrive at true verdicts.  Just as 
juror decision making is shaped by the rules of evidence and other 
rules surrounding deliberation processes, expert testimony is shaped 
by the way it is presented in American trials.  In this Section, I review 
 
 168 Id. at 282. 
 169 Jonathan D. Casper et al., Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 
13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1989).  Recent articles arguing for bifurcation as a way 
to focus jury decision making include Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 
WASH. L. REV. 705 (2000), and Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 
1601 (2001). 
 170 Diamond & Vidmar, Juries and Expert Evidence, supra note 143, at 1135 (2001); 
see also Nisbett et al., supra note 108. 
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empirical evidence on the effect of the expert’s role on expert 
testimony and then turn to evidence concerning the effect of the 
expert’s demeanor. 
1.  The Effect of the Expert’s Role on Expert Testimony 
Any discussion of speaker characteristics must address the 
adversarial status of experts in the American system.  In inquisitorial 
systems such as Belgium, France, Germany, and Japan, the judge 
plays a large role in the production of evidence.  Experts are almost 
always court appointed and are asked to submit written reports.  
Parties may be given the opportunity to object to a particular expert, 
question the expert about the opinion rendered, or hire their own 
expert to rebut the court-appointed expert, but the process is 
relatively non-adversarial.171  By way of contrast, our system is one in 
which the parties generally select, prepare, and present experts.  
Court appointed experts are rare.  The vast majority of experts are 
party witnesses.172 
A substantial body of psychological literature suggests that 
adopting a role affects attention to details, memory retrieval, and 
decision thresholds.173  Some research on witnesses confirms this 
effect.  In one study, Shepard and Vidmar, conducted an experiment 
where undergraduates viewed a slide show and heard an audio tape 
depicting a fight.  The “witnesses” then were interviewed by an 
adversary or non-adversary lawyer and a week later testified about 
what they saw.  Witnesses interviewed by the adversary lawyer biased 
their testimony in favor of the lawyer’s client and this affected the 
impressions of the factual evidence and the responsibility judgments 
of “naive” adjudicators who did not know who had interviewed the 
witness.174 
 
 171 CAROL A.G. JONES, EXPERT WITNESSES: SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW (1994); see also John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985); Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial 
Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983 (1999). 
 172 See Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a 
Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995 (1994); 
see also Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, The Use of Court-Appointed Experts in Federal 
Courts, 78 JUDICATURE J. 41 (July-Aug. 1994); Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney 
Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309 (2002). 
 173 See D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects 
in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 18-19 
(2002). 
 174 Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar, Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testimonial 
Evidence: Effects of Lawyer’s Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320 
(1980). 
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In a follow-up study, Vidmar and Laird had students witness the 
same fight stimulus.175  This time the experimenters manipulated the 
students’ role simply by telling the students they would appear either 
as a witness of the court or as a witness for either the plaintiff or the 
defendant.  Student “judges” who were blind to this manipulation 
were asked to rate whether the evidence provided by the witness 
favored the plaintiff or the defendant.  Separately, a set of raters 
heard the testimony of the witnesses and rated it as more or less pro-
plaintiff.  For both “judges” and raters, when compared to witnesses 
who testified from a neutral role, witnesses who testified for an 
adversary party produced testimony favorable to that party.176  
Interestingly, when the witnesses themselves were asked to rate the 
evidence as pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant, their assigned role did not 
influence their judgment, i.e. the ratings of “plaintiff,” “defendant,” 
and neutral witnesses did not significantly differ from one another. 
One must be careful in drawing conclusions from a study that is 
so weak on ecological validity.  However, the results do suggest that 
very weak “role” manipulations can produce biasing effects even 
among “witnesses” who themselves have no psychological or 
economic interest in a given outcome.  In general, experts are more 
likely to come to the stand with “hot biases.”177  Such biases are not 
necessarily intentional but they are directionally motivated.  The 
experts are more likely to want a certain outcome to prevail.178  Justice 
Breyer expressed this concern with respect to the plaintiff’s expert’s 
testimony in Kumho.179 
 
 175 Neil Vidmar & Nancy MacDonald Laird, Adversary Social Roles: Their Effects on 
Witnesses’ Communications of Evidence and the Assessments of Adjudicators, 44 J. PERS. & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 888 (1983). 
 176 Id. at 893. 
 177 Some biases are intentional, e.g. those that are the result of fraud or advocacy.  
Other biases may be thought of as “hot.”  They are often unintentional and even 
unconscious but they are directionally motivated because the individual expects or 
wants an outcome to prevail.  Still other biases are “cold.”  They occur even in the 
absence of a desire for a certain outcome and in spite of a desire to achieve accuracy.  
Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, in ANN. REV. 
OF PSYCHOL. 259, 268 (Janet T. Spence et al. eds., 1998). 
 178 Id. at 268. 
 179 Indeed, no one has argued that Carlson himself, were he still working for 
Michelin, 
would have concluded in a report to his employer that a similar tire was 
similarly defective on grounds identical to those upon which he rested 
his conclusion here.  Of course, Carlson himself claimed that his 
method was accurate, but, as we pointed out in Joiner, “nothing in 
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court 
to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by 
the ipse dixit of the expert.”  522 U.S. at 146. 
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These hot biases may in turn increase the likelihood of cold 
biases.180  Indeed, the two may merge together to form what MacCoun 
describes as “warm” biases, influenced both by motivation and 
cognition.181  When federal judges are asked about problems they 
encounter with expert testimony, the most frequently mentioned 
problem is that experts abandon objectivity and become advocates 
for the side that hired them.182 
 
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 157. 
 180 Meadow and Sunstein provide a useful example of cold biases in the context of 
medical doctor judgements concerning bacterial meningitis in children.  They note 
that the disease is an infection of the brain that can usually be treated with antibiotics 
and, in general, the sooner the antibiotics are begun the better the outcome.  In a 
malpractice case, therefore, an important question is whether the treatment was 
unreasonably delayed. 
The authors interviewed doctors with relevant specialties to determine how long, 
in their opinion, it would take to administer antibiotics to a child brought to the 
emergency room with relevant symptoms, and compared their response with the 
actual time it took to administer antibiotics to ninety-three children treated at two 
large university-associated pediatric centers in Chicago.  The doctors, like most 
individuals, exhibited an optimism bias.  The median estimate of fifty-four pediatric 
emergency room specialists was forty-six minutes and that of twenty-three pediatric 
infectious disease specialists was eighty minutes.  But the actual median time to 
treatment in the two hospitals was 120 minutes, a time nearly identical to times 
reported in hospitals in South Carolina and California.  The authors note that this 
bias operates independently of the pressures imposed by the adversary system.  
William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 DUKE L.J. 629, 636-39 
(2001). 
Anchoring effects are another example of a cold bias.  Anchoring effects occur 
when estimates people make are influenced by arbitrary starting positions.  For 
example, estimates of the length of the Mississippi River, the number of countries in 
the U.N., and the annual meat consumption of the average American, all are 
affected by asking people whether the number is above or below some arbitrary 
starting point.  Michael Risinger et al., supra note 173, at 17. 
 181 MacCoun, supra note 177, at 268. 
 182 Carol Krafka et al., supra note 172, at 328. 
One solution to this latter difficulty would be the greater use of court appointed 
experts.  Some are concerned, however, that such testimony would overwhelm and 
unduly influence the jury.  There is a certain irony in the fact that this objection is 
itself a paternalistic argument.  It argues that juries will engage in peripheral 
processing by focusing on the neutral status of the expert rather than centrally 
processing the merits of the expert’s argument.  Brekke et al., conducted a 
laboratory experiment designed to assess this potential.  Registered voters who 
volunteered to participate were shown a videotape re-enactment of a sexual assault 
trial.  Nancy J. Brekke et al., Of Juries and Court - Appointed Experts: The Impact of 
Nonadversarial versus Adversarial Expert Testimony, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451 (1991).  
In adversarial versions of the trial the testimony was presented by an expert 
introduced as a prosecution witness and examined by attorneys, while in non-
adversarial versions the expert was introduced as a court-appointed expert and 
questioned only by the judge.  In a fully crossed design, the content of the expert’s 
testimony was also manipulated.  Half the jurors heard one-sided testimony (favoring 
the prosecution) while others heard balanced testimony.  Some subjects deliberated 
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Jurors are not stupid, however.  They know that the experts are 
testifying for a party.  There is some evidence that jurors give greater 
scrutiny to adversarial testimony than non-adversarial testimony.183  
However, witness biases are often difficult to detect.  This is especially 
so when the expert offers only a holistic, summary judgment without 
a detailed discussion of the factors that produce the judgment.  The 
use of objective, rational admissibility criteria increases the likelihood 
that unreliable opinions will be excluded.184 
 
in groups of six, while others did not deliberate.  All subjects were asked to assess the 
expert’s credibility and to rate the expert’s testimony.  The results provide mixed 
support to those who are concerned about the effects of court appointed experts.  
On the one hand, fears that a court-appointed expert would simply overwhelm jurors 
were not supported.  Court-appointed status did not boost the expert’s credibility.  
Id. at 468.  On the other hand, deliberating jurors were less responsive to the content 
of the non-adversarial experts.  For example, conviction rates varied with the content 
of the expert testimony in the adversarial condition, but not in the non-adversarial 
condition.  Id. at 470.  One explanation for this result is that non-adversarial expert 
testimony is subjected to less central processing, but the authors note that their study 
is not well-designed to test this explanation. 
Note that in the above study, the subjects heard either a court-appointed expert 
or a party expert, but the experts were not pitted against each other.  In actual trials, 
it would be more likely that jurors would hear both types of experts.  Cooper and 
Hall conducted a study that did exactly this.  Joel Cooper & Joan Hall, Reactions of 
Mock Jurors to Testimony of a Court Appointed Expert, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 719 (2000).  
Undergraduates, playing the role of jurors heard testimony about a plaintiff’s injury 
in an automobile accident.  In some conditions, medical testimony was presented by 
party experts for each side and in other conditions an additional, court-appointed 
expert testified.  In the cells with a court-appointed expert, half the time the expert 
sided with the plaintiff and half the time the expert sided with the defendant.  
Sometimes, the defendant was an individual, and sometimes a corporation.  There 
was no deliberation.  The jurors sided with the court-appointed expert in every 
condition except when the expert favored a corporate defendant. 
 183 Brekke et al., supra note 182, at 457-58. 
 184 See Joseph Sanders, Kumho and How We Know, 64(2 & 3) LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 373 (2001).  For example, in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare, 947 F. Supp.1387, 1404-
05 (D. Or. 1996), the district court ultimately excluded the testimony of an 
epidemiological expert who, at an initial admissibility hearing, stated that he was not 
willing to testify, based on the then existing sixteen epidemiological studies, that 
silicone implants more likely than not could cause systemic autoimmune disease in 
women.  However, later, with the release of one additional abstract of an 
unpublished epidemiological study, the expert reported that he was prepared to 
change his testimony and say that it is more likely than not that implants cause 
systemic autoimmune disease.  The abstract itself reports that it included only three 
women with implants and the authors of the abstract reached a different conclusion 
than the expert.  The Judge’s response to this change of position was perhaps 
predictable.  He said in a footnote, “I find this change in so-called ‘scientific opinion’ 
not only suspect but shocking, with no scientific basis to support it.  This is exactly 
the type of ‘junk science’ that the Supreme Court in Daubert I commanded courts to 
exclude.”  Id.  It is not my point to argue whether this expert’s testimony should be 
admitted, but only to note that, had the expert been asked simply to present a 
summary opinion about the relationship of silicone implants and autoimmune 
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Role effects have the potential to affect not only the testimony of 
the individual expert but the total body of testimony presented to the 
jury.  A number of commentators have observed that because the 
experts are chosen by the parties, the system favors the selection of 
experts with extreme views, rather than views that are representative 
of the scientific community.185  This may give the jurors the 
impression that there is less consensus in a field than actually exists.186  
For example, I interviewed jurors in one of the Bendectin cases.  
Most would agree that the research on the question of whether the 
drug caused birth defects in the offspring of the mothers who took it 
to control morning sickness clearly points in the direction of no 
causal relationship, and this is the position of the great majority of 
knowledgeable scientists.  Nevertheless, the jurors generally 
concluded that scientists were divided equally on the issue, or that 
most scientists thought Bendectin was a teratogen.187  Moreover, they 
tended to discount the epidemiological evidence and rate 
epidemiology in general as less probative than animal studies, and in 
vitro research.188  This result is not surprising within the context of 
the trial.  The jurors heard approximately an equal number of 
experts on each side of the issue, lending an impression that the 
scientific community was closely divided on the causal question.189  
Moreover, plaintiff’s experts stressed the importance of other types of 
 
disease, it would have been much more difficult to assess his potential bias. 
 185 MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN 
LITIGATION (1983). 
 186 SANDERS, supra note 96, at 130. 
 187 Id. at 126.  This may be an example of an anchoring effect.  When asked to 
make numerical estimates, people are strongly influenced by the initial value 
presented to them.  Insofar as the jurors were “presented” with a similar number of 
plaintiff and defense experts, this anchor may have influenced their final estimate of 
the distribution of opinion on the causal question. 
 188 Id. at 129. 
 189 As Saks and Wissler note, 
In civil litigation . . . all manner of experts are found to testify opposite 
their colleagues. 
 
Whether such “balancing” of expert witnesses helps the fact-finder 
evaluate their testimony is another matter.  The search for witnesses 
that is driven by the adversary process may result in a distortion of 
knowledge when applied to expert witnesses.  For example, if 999 of 
every 1000 experts in a given field hold one view of a question and one 
holds an alternate view, the two experts who appear in court will have 
been detached from the extremely skewed distribution of opinion from 
which they were drawn.  The fact finder has no way of knowing this. 
Michael J. Saks & Roselle L. Wissler, Legal and Psychological Bases of Expert Testimony: 
Surveys of the Law and of Jurors, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 435, 439-40 (1984). 
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evidence and frequently denigrated epidemiology.  Consider the 
following exchange between the plaintiff’s lawyer and a plaintiff 
expert testifying, on the basis of in vitro studies, that is a teratogen in 
humans. 
Q:  Well, Doctor, the kind of work that we’ve been talking about, 
is that what’s known as hard science? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  As opposed to soft science? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  What is hard science? 
A:  Hard science is science that’s experimentally based, where the 
data that’s collected is based on procedures, protocols that have 
been designed to have groups that are treated with something, 
groups that act as controls, all of the variables are under control 
by the experimenter so that you administer the drugs at the same 
time, you administer them to animals of a given age, the timing 
and the environment of the experiment is under control, and, 
therefore, you can rely on the data that comes out of a set of 
experiments like this.  The experiments can be done by 
somebody else in another laboratory and they can be confirmed if 
they were correct in the first place and so on . . . . 
Q:  What would, for example, soft science be? 
A:  A soft science would be thing like taking polls of people 
depending on their memory of circumstances. 
Q:  What about epidemiology; is that a soft science? 
A:  That’s a soft science, yes.190 
In the face of such testimony, it is not surprising that some jurors 
may have a hard time coming to an appreciation about the balance of 
scientific opinion on an issue.  I described these jurors as one-eyed 
fact-finders.  “Far from being blind, they can see everything around 
them.  What they lack is depth perception.  All experts appear 
similarly qualified, all evidence of similar value and relevance.”191 
2.  The Witness’s Demeanor 
Because the truth of a witness’s statements is sometimes 
impossible to verify, the law has long encouraged jurors to use the 
witness’s demeanor as a clue to veracity.  This is, of course, a type of 
 
 190 Testimony of Dr. Stuart Newman, at 12, Havner v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 88-3915-F. 214th Judicial District, Nueces County, Texas 
(Sept. 6, 1991) ( on file with author). 
 191 Id. at 130. 
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peripheral processing.  Nevertheless, in the absence of any alternative 
way to assess veracity, the law is simply bowing to the inevitable in 
approving the use of demeanor evidence as an aid to decision 
making.  In fact, what evidence we have suggests that demeanor cues 
often reduce accuracy in detecting witness deception.192  Even when 
deception is not an issue, aspects of a witness’s demeanor may 
mislead the jury.  For example, it is well documented that jurors tend 
to believe that eyewitness accuracy is strongly correlated with 
eyewitness certainty, even though the actual correlation is quite 
weak.193 
In the domain of expert witness testimony, the problem is 
exacerbated by selection effects.  Sam Gross makes this point in the 
following passage: 
expert witnesses can become expert courtroom performers; they 
can learn by repeated practice to present their testimony to 
achieve maximum effect.  Attorneys, for their part, can select 
expert witnesses by the same criteria—they can (and do) shop 
around for those experts with the best testimonial manner and 
the most appealing credentials, and they avoid those experts 
(however knowledgeable) who look bad, speak poorly, or have 
insufficiently impressive diplomas.194 
The lawyers in the focus groups discussed above report choosing 
experts in part because of their demeanor.  All in all, as Brewer notes, 
[d]emeanor is an especially untrustworthy guide where there is 
what we might call a lucrative “market” for demeanor itself. . . .  
Judges, lawyers, and commentators are thoroughly aware that 
lawyers choose expert witnesses at least as much because they will 
appear to a jury to be competent as because (in the lawyer’s 
judgment) the experts actually are competent.195 
Similarly, in most cases involving complex scientific and technical 
 
 192 See Saks, supra note 93, at 21; see also Gerald R. Miller & Judee K. Burgoon, 
Factors Affecting Assessments of Witness Credibility, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE 
COURTROOM 169, 182-90 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982); Joseph W. 
Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1, 7-16 
(2000) (discussing the psychological literature on the ability to detect lying by the 
use of demeanor cues). 
 193 See DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 20, ch. 15. 
 194 Gross, supra note 125, at 1133.  Gross cites a number of “how to” books 
recommending the selection of witness based in part on their demeanor.  He cites a 
1967 survey of judges, lawyers and doctors in the Los Angeles area that found that 
“[o]ver three-quarters of the attorneys responding . . . indicated that some factor 
other than medical expertise—usually an impressive ‘courtroom manner’—often 
determines the choice of an expert witness.” 
 195 Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 
1535, 1622-23 (1998). 
 924 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:881 
evidence, the academic and professional credentials of the various 
experts are sufficiently impressive and sufficiently similar that they 
offer little useful information to a juror who might wish to assess the 
merits of an argument based on the qualifications of its proponent.196  
In sum, the credentials and demeanor of an expert witness are 
unlikely to be of much probative value to jurors in cases involving 
complex issues. 
C.  The Characteristics of the Controller (Gatekeeper) 
Articles about jury competence often note that it would be 
wrong to assume that judges, acting as triers of fact, would do much 
better.  Anecdotal evidence is sometimes to the contrary.  For 
example, Gross cites Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.197  By 
agreement of the parties, the case was tried by the judge rather than a 
jury, who found for the plaintiff in her claim that her mother’s use of 
a contraceptive spermicide caused her birth defects.  In his opinion, 
Judge Shoob explained his verdict as follows: 
The Court’s decision, therefore, turned on the oral testimony of a 
variety of expert witnesses whose opinions often were 
diametrically opposed on the major issues presented in the case.  
In assessing the credibility of these witnesses, the Court 
considered each expert’s background, training, experience, and 
familiarity with the circumstances of this particular case; and the 
Court evaluated the rationality and internal consistency of each 
expert’s testimony in light of all the evidence presented.  The 
Court paid close attention to each expert’s demeanor and tone.  
Perhaps most important, the Court did its best to ascertain the 
motives, biases, and interests that might have influenced each 
expert’s opinion. 
With few exceptions, the Court found the testimony of plaintiffs’ 
experts generally to be competent, credible, and directed to the 
specific circumstances of this case.  The testimony of defendant’s 
experts, in contrast, often indicated bias or inconsistency.198 
The judge then proceeded to provide a bill of particulars concerning 
his judgment about individual plaintiff and defense experts.  
Unfortunately, the judge was wrong.  Relying on the same 
considerations that may send a jury astray, demeanor and prejudice, 
the judge ruled for the plaintiff even in the face of an FDA report 
 
 196 See SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL, supra note 96, at 120-22. 
 197 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff’d and modified in part, 788 F.2d 741 (11th 
Cir. 1986). 
 198 Id. at 266-67. 
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concluding that the spermicide did not cause birth defects.  The 
judge discounted the FDA report because one of the defense experts 
had served as a consultant to the FDA panel of scientists who 
conducted the investigation.199  A single case does not resolve the 
issue of judicial competence, of course, but it is far from the only 
evidence that judges, too, may have trouble assessing complex expert 
testimony, especially testimony involving statistical evidence.200 
Judges are also susceptible to the usual cognitive biases that 
afflict most people.  Guthrie, et al., asked 167 United States magistrate 
judges to respond to a five page questionnaire that presented them 
with five items designed to assess the influence of five common 
cognitive biases: (1) anchoring (the misuse of an artificial initial value 
on a numerical estimate); (2) framing (the effect of framing a 
decision in terms of “gains” or “losses” on risky decisions); (3) 
hindsight bias (overestimating the probability of a known past 
incident); (4) the representative heuristic (underutilization of base 
rate information); and (5) egocentric biases (believing onself to be 
above average on various dimensions).201  To a greater or lesser 
extent, the magistrates fell prey to each of the biases.  However, the 
authors concluded that judges did better than other groups with 
respect to the framing and the representativeness heuristic biases.202  
They concluded that judges are likely to be better decision-makers in 
circumstances where decision-making experience blunts the effects of 
illusions.  For example, even though both judges and jurors are 
prone to anchoring effects, the deleterious effects of this problem is a 
product of the reasonableness of the initial value.  Insofar as judges 
have better starting values, the adverse effects of anchoring will be 
minimized.  This might occur, for example, were the judge to assess 
damages based on prior damage awards in similar cases rather than 
on some value suggested by one of the litigants to the present 
lawsuit.203  Similarly, if judges are better than juries with respect to the 
representativeness heuristic, they may be in a better position to assess 
the relevance of a piece of evidence.  On the other hand, jurors 
might be better in minimizing the effects of hindsight bias. 
All of this data is quite instructive, but it is not entirely relevant 
 
 199 Gross, supra note 125, at 1123. 
 200 See Gary Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability 
Enough?, 62 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739 (1992); see also THE EVOLVING ROLE OF 
STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989). 
 201 Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 817 
(2001). 
 202 Id. at 817. 
 203 Id. at 826. 
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to the admissibility question per se.  The question is not whether we 
should substitute fact finders.  Rather, it is whether judges can 
perform a gatekeeping role with sufficient skill that on balance they 
improve the probability of a correct outcome at the end of the case.  
This question leads us to the fourth variable, the controller’s 
criterion of selection among speakers or messages. 
 
D.  The Controller’s Criterion of Selection Among Speakers or Messages 
Data on how judges actually decide admissibility decisions is 
quite limited.  Sophia Gatowski and her colleagues conducted 
telephone interviews with a sample of 400 state court trial judges 
from all fifty states that was designed to assess their understanding of 
the Daubert admissibility criteria.204  Most of the judges reported 
having some CLE training about scientific evidence, but ninety-six 
percent reported no training about scientific methods and principles.  
Therefore, it is unsurprising that the judges had difficulty explaining 
the Daubert falsifiability and error rate criteria.  The authors 
concluded that only four percent of the judges offered an 
explanation that involved a clear understanding of falsifiability and 
thirty-five percent gave answers that were clearly wrong.  The results 
were similar with respect to error rate.  The judges did much better 
when asked to explain peer review and general acceptance.  Seventy-
one percent clearly understood the former and eighty-two percent 
clearly understood the latter.  Based on this study, one would 
conclude that judges would do better by peripherally processing the 
adequacy of expert testimony than by attempting to centrally process 
the evidence with the first two Daubert criteria as a guide. 
Unfortunately, it is unclear from this study whether the 
problems judges had as a group in providing definitions translates 
into poor admissibility decisions.  Another study by Margaret Kovera 
and Bradley McAuliff suggests that it may.205  They surveyed circuit 
court judges in Florida to examine whether they were able to identify 
research flaws in proposed expert testimony in a hostile work 
environment sexual harassment case.  The expert proposed to testify 
concerning a study the expert had conducted on whether exposure 
to sexually suggestive materials influenced participants’ subsequent 
 
 204 Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on 
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001). 
 205 Margaret Kovera & Bradley McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review and Evidence 
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interactions with a female confederate.  Some judges heard a version 
without methodological flaws.  Others heard versions that were 
altered to include one of three flaws: a missing control group,206 a 
confound,207 or potential experimenter bias due to a non-blind 
 
 206 In the correctly done study, men exposed to sexually explicit materials were 
compared with men who were not.  In the first flawed study, the second group was 
absent.  Without a control group it is usually difficult to know what to make of any 
results.  FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 4-4.1.2, offers 
the following example: 
[O]ccasionally people have suggested that marijuana, even if not 
harmful in itself, is dangerous because it leads (by some 
pharmacological or psychological or sociological route) to the use of 
harder drugs.  They have offered the suggestion that if a substantial 
number of heroin addicts were found to have used marijuana when 
they were younger, that would confirm the hypothesis.  Figure 3 depicts 
the pattern of data such commentators have in mind.  The 
hypothetical data in the figure show sixty percent of a sample of 500 
heroin addicts to have used marijuana at an earlier time. 
 
Figure 3 
Single row (or column) missing data pattern 
 
Heroin                      Smoke Marijuana at Time-1 
Addict                       Yes                         No 
 
at Time-2  
 
Yes                                                           300                          200 
 
No                                                            —                            — 
 
Because these data [do not have a control group], they cannot reveal 
whether or not a relationship exists.  More specifically, without 
comparison data we cannot know whether fewer than sixty percent, 
about the same sixty percent, or more than sixty percent of people who 
are not heroin addicts earlier smoked marijuana.  And it is on that 
comparison that the existence or non-existence of a relationship 
depends. 
 
Suppose, for example, that someone had proposed that drinking milk 
as a child led to heroin addiction as an adult.  The same table with 
marijuana replaced by milk would reveal that more than ninety-nine 
percent of heroin addicts drank milk as children.  Would that reveal 
that milk was to blame?  Filling in the data for the rest of the table 
would make clear that ninety-nine percent of non-heroin addicts drank 
milk as children, and therefore no relationship between milk drinking 
and heroin addiction existed.  Until the rest of the data were supplied 
for Figure 3, one could not tell whether a relationship existed between 
marijuana smoking and heroin addiction, other than by speculating on 
what the missing cells contained. 
 207 In a confounding situation, some other variable, often introduced as part of 
the methodology of the study, may be what explains one’s result.  Because of the 
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confederate.208 
Judges’ ratings of the quality of the study did not differ based on 
these manipulations.  Judges were also asked to make an admissibility 
decision concerning this expert.  Again, the quality of the study did 
not affect this decision.  Judge rating of the reliability of the evidence 
revealed some effect.  Judges who had received training in scientific 
methods rated the valid study significantly more positively than other 
judges who had not undergone training.209  However, training seems 
not to have sensitized judges to the specific methodological problems 
associated with missing control groups or the lack of a blind 
condition. 
It is unfortunate that these studies did not include a sample of 
federal judges.  State court trial judges rarely write opinions and, 
therefore, there is no opportunity to examine whether their inability 
to provide a definition translates into poor judgments or, on the 
other hand, whether when forced to rule on admissibility in a case 
involving complex scientific data, judges are able to provide a clear 
written explanation for their opinion. 
Because federal judges do often write opinions, especially when 
their admissibility decision has the effect of non-suiting one of the 
parties, it is theoretically possible to assess judicial understanding by 
looking at the opinions themselves.  I am not aware of any systematic 
effort to do this.  My own reading of the vast majority of Daubert 
opinions in toxic tort cases, leads me to believe that the opinions 
themselves display a range of comprehension.210  Judging by opinions, 
far more than four percent of the cases exhibit a clear understanding 
 
study design, there is no way to separate out the independent effects of the variable 
of interest and the confounder.  In this study the confound was introduced by using 
two research assistants.  One of the assistants only interacted with men exposed to 
sexual material and the other research assistant only interacted with men who were 
not exposed.  The problem is that we cannot now ascertain whether the effects we 
observe are due to the presence or absence of sexually explicit materials or, on the 
other hand, are due to differences in the attributes of the two research assistants.  Of 
course, the more similar the assistants are to each other, the less we may be 
concerned by this threat to internal validity. 
 208 Best experimental practice “blinds” researchers (and often subjects as well) to 
the treatment.  Here, a confederate who observed participant interactions with 
women employees knew whether the participants had or had not been in the 
experimental condition.  The danger is that this knowledge may skew the 
confederate’s observation in favor of the underlying hypothesis (i.e. that exposure 
alters behavior). 
 209 Margaret Kovera et al., Assessment of the Commonsense Psychology Underlying 
Daubert, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 180, 186 (2002). 
 210 This nearly masochistic act is the result of required annual updates to a 
treatise. 
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of falsifiability and nowhere near thirty-five percent are clearly wrong.  
The same might be said of the error rate.  Moreover, many opinions 
do not turn on either of these criteria, but rather on an analysis of 
internal and external validity threats to the research underlying an 
expert’s testimony and the fit between the findings in this research 
and the conclusions drawn by the expert.211 
The fact that the federal district court opinions paint a more 
favorable picture of judicial conceptual understanding than the 
Gatowski and Kovera results is not surprising.  Many of the federal 
opinions follow a Rule 104A Daubert hearing in which the court has 
heard the parties and their experts discuss and brief the merits of the 
expert knowledge in question.  Moreover, more federal judges have 
enjoyed some education in research methodology through Federal 
Judicial Center programs.  Unfortunately, fewer state court judges 
have this opportunity nor do they have the luxury of lengthy 
admissibility hearings or a clerk to assist them in their decision 
making. 
Even if a survey of federal judges demonstrated that they could 
provide a clear definition of the Daubert criteria, this does not mean 
that judges employ the criteria wisely.  Knowledge is not the same 
thing as judgment.  Unfortunately, at the federal level there does not 
exist any individual level data on the merits of judicial decisions to 
admit or exclude.  What is available is aggregate data from a recent 
Rand study on the effects of Daubert on civil litigation.212  In this study, 
Dixon and Gill analyze 399 federal district court opinions between 
January 1980 and June 1999 that addressed challenges to expert 
evidence in civil cases.213  Many of the opinions analyzed more than 
one element of evidence and the researchers separately coded 601 
 
 211 See FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFC EVIDENCE, supra note 21, ch. 34-35.  This 
intuition that non-Daubert factors have played an increasingly important role is 
supported by a recent Rand study on the effect of Daubert.  Dixon and Gill note that: 
after Daubert, challengers and judges initially focused on the Daubert 
factors when challenging and evaluating reliability. . . .  As time passed, 
however, and judges gained experience in evaluating reliability and 
appellate court opinions reinforced their authority, challengers and 
judges would have felt less compelled to address each Daubert factor 
and instead paid increasing attention to more general factors 
important to assessing reliability. 
Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in 
Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 251, 284-85 
(2002). 
 212 Dixon & Gill, supra note 211. 
 213 This group consisted of a thirty-three percent random sample of 1,345 civil 
cases that a Westlaw search identified as dealing with admissibility of expert 
testimony.  Id. at 264. 
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elements.  Nearly half of the cases involved personal injury.  
Contracts and business torts (16%) was the next largest category.  
Fifteen percent of the cases were lumped into a general “other and 
unknown” category.214  Approximately eighty percent of the evidence 
discussed in the opinions was proposed by plaintiffs, and a similar 
percentage of the challenges came from defendants. 
The researchers concluded that during the period of their study, 
judges did scrutinize expert testimony more carefully and applied 
stricter admissibility standards, not only with respect to the reliability 
factor but also with respect to relevance and expert qualifications.215  
This trend began even before the Daubert opinion and continued 
after that opinion.  Moreover, challenges to expert evidence 
increasingly resulted in a summary judgment.216 
Dixon and Gill are especially interested in how litigants 
responded to this tightening in standards.  They observe that up until 
1997, the proportion of evidence excluded increases consistent with 
the stricter scrutiny under Daubert.  After 1997, however, there is a 
decline in the percentage of evidence elements excluded, controlling 
for type of case.217  The authors assume that the admissibility standard 
did not change in this period and, therefore, concluded that this 
declining rate is consistent with one or both of the following factors.  
It could be that the declining rate occurred because the parties, 
emboldened by past successes, extend their challenges to relatively 
better evidence and their success rates on the margin decline.  On 
the other hand, it could be that challenges are less successful, 
because the parties have responded to heightened scrutiny by 
offering, on average, better evidence.  In the authors’ judgment, both 
processes may have been at work.218 
Dixon and Gill are careful to note what their study cannot do: it 
cannot specifically address the question of how well judges are 
performing the gatekeeping function.  There are some indicia that 
federal judges were becoming more sophisticated in their 
explanations for exclusion.  In the first few years after Daubert, judges 
seem to have been feeling their way and their opinions hewed closely 
to the Daubert criteria. 
Over time, however, as judges gained experience in evaluating 
reliability and as appellate court opinions reinforced their 
 
 214 Id. at 267. 
 215 Id. at 274, 291. 
 216 Id. at 294-96. 
 217 Id. at 292-93. 
 218 Dixon & Gill, supra note 211, at 299. 
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authority, they appear to have felt less compelled to address each 
Daubert factor and to have paid increasing attention to more 
general issues important to addressing reliability.  Of particular 
note was the rapid rise in the frequency with which judges 
addressed the clarity and coherence of the expert’s explanation 
of the theory, methods, and procedures underlying the 
evidence.219 
But greater sophistication does not necessarily mean better 
judgment.220  The authors suggest a research design that would have a 
panel of experts assess the reliability of admitted and excluded 
evidence.221 
In sum, the data available to address Goldman’s fourth factor is 
limited and somewhat contradictory.  At the state level, the Gatowski, 
Kovera, and McAuliff research should give pause as to the ability of 
courts to apply some Daubert factors.  At the federal level, the Dixon 
and Gill paper offers persuasive evidence that expert evidence has 
been subjected to greater scrutiny and the discussion of the evidence 
in judicial opinions exhibits greater sophistication than in the years 
immediately following Daubert.  However, we have only 
impressionistic evidence about the “correctness” of these opinions.  
Indeed, we probably do not have much agreement about what 
constitutes a “correct” outcome.  Dixon and Gill’s proposal would 
constitute a first step, but only a first step.  Even if one could reduce 
concepts such as reliability to a single dimension, and then rank 
order opinions along such a dimension, one would still be left with 
the question of the optimal degree of scrutiny. 
E.  The Availability of Other Alternate Channels of Communication 
That Address the Same Topic 
For the purposes of this paper, Goldman’s final criterion might 
 
 219 Id. 
 220 Psychologists are likely to make this point by distinguishing between coherence 
and correspondence.  Most psychological research on decision making involves 
coherence theories and tries to explain the process by which a person’s judgements 
are logical and rational, or not.  Correspondence theories, on the other hand, are 
designed to explain why or why not a person’s judgments achieve empirical accuracy.  
See Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?  The Unwarranted Pessimism of 
the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1941 (2002).  Of 
course there may be a correlation between coherence and correspondence, but one 
does not perfectly predict the other.  Judges may “talk a good Daubert game” and still 
get it wrong in much the same way that Judge Shoob talked a good demeanor game 
in the spermicide case, but got it wrong. 
 221 The authors also note that their study did not address the question of costs nor 
could it assess Daubert’s overall affect on case outcomes.  Dixon & Gill, supra note 211, 
at 301-02. 
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be put as follows: are there other, perhaps better, ways to assist jurors 
than restricting the information they hear?  The Kansas Supreme 
Court, for example, argued in Kuhn that the traditional tools of 
attorney argument—opposing experts and vigorous cross-
examination—are sufficient to guard against decisions based on 
unreliable evidence. 
Diamond and her colleagues examined this proposition within 
the context of a criminal case.222  The stimulus involved the testimony 
of an expert modeled after a Dr. James Grigson, a psychiatrist who 
regularly testified for the prosecution in death penalty cases on the 
issue of future dangerousness.223  Typically, Dr. Grigson would testify 
that the defendant constituted an ongoing danger.  For example, in 
Barefoot v. Estelle, he stated that there was a “one-hundred percent and 
absolute chance” the defendant would commit future crimes of 
violence.224  In the experiment, the jury, drawn from the Cook 
County, Illinois jury pool, watched a seventy-five minute videotape of 
a death penalty hearing involving an armed robbery and murder of a 
stranger who the defendant robbed in order to buy beer.225 
In three conditions of the experiment, the jurors heard the 
prosecution’s expert state that he had diagnosed the defendant as a 
sociopath, based solely on an examination of records of prior court 
proceedings, pre-sentence reports, and prison records.  The expert 
concluded that the defendant was “certain to kill again” if he was not 
executed.  The expert asserted that he had extensive prior 
experience in making such predictions, and his predictions were 
generally accurate.226 
In the first, “weak cross-examination” condition, the defense 
only brought out the fact that the witness usually testified for the 
state, but did not challenge the future dangerousness prediction.227  
In the second, “strong cross-examination” condition, the defense 
 
 222 Shari Se. Diamond et al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 17 (1996). 
 223 In Texas, where Dr. Grigson most frequently testified, the jury could not 
impose the death sentence unless they concluded that the defendant was likely to 
“commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to 
society.”  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (Vernon 2002). 
 224 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 919 (1983). 
 225 Diamond et al., supra note 222, at 19. 
 226 Id. at 38. 
 227 There is some evidence that this is a typical cross in many circumstances.  My 
experience in reading the trial transcripts of seven Bendectin trials is that the vast 
majority of cross is devoted to expert qualifications and potential sources of bias.  
Margaret Kovora et al., Assessment of the Commonsense Psychology Underlying Daubert, 8 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 180, 192 (2002) (reporting a similar result). 
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added to the cross in the weak condition by pointing out at length 
that the expert’s prediction of future killing was inconsistent with 
prior research and that the expert has not employed the standard 
methods for diagnosing future dangerousness.  The witness admitted 
on the stand that the best scientific literature indicates that two-thirds 
of dangerousness predictions prove to be incorrect.  The cross-
examination also brought out the fact that the expert had never 
published his findings in peer-reviewed journals.  The expert 
responded that he was focused on clinical diagnosis, not publication, 
and that he was confident he was correct.228  In the third, “strong 
cross-examination plus defense expert” condition, the defense lawyer 
conducted the same cross-examination as in the strong-cross 
condition.  In addition, a defense expert, who was also a psychiatrist, 
testified that the defendant coped reasonably well but on rare 
occasions excessive drinking interacted with a personality disorder to 
produce violence.  The defense expert testified that predictions 
about future violence could not be made with any certainty, but that 
in his view, the likelihood of future similar violence was not great and 
the defendant was a good candidate for an alcohol abuse program.229 
In a fourth “control” condition, the plaintiff expert made a 
realistic prediction, basically agreeing with the defense expert that 
predictions of future dangerousness are accurate only about one-
third of the time, but warned about the defendant’s potential for 
future violence.  The cross-examination was identical to the cross in 
the first condition.230 
The dependent variables in the study included a question about 
the persuasiveness of the state’s expert, the jury verdict preference 
(death or life), and a verdict confidence index.  The first condition, 
with a strong prediction of future dangerousness, no opposing 
expert, and a weak cross should produce the highest percentage of 
death penalty verdicts.  If cross-examination is an effective 
prophylactic against unreliable testimony, the second condition 
should produce lower persuasiveness scores and a lower percentage 
of death penalty verdicts.  And the combination of a powerful cross 
and an opposing expert should produce still lower persuasiveness 
scores and even fewer death penalty verdicts.  Ideally, this version 
 
 228 Diamond et al., supra note 222, at 39. 
 229 Id. 
 230 My discussion of this condition and the results come from a chapter of an as 
yet unpublished book by Diamond and Casper.  SHARI S. DIAMOND & JONATHAN D. 
CASPER, UNDERSTANDING JURIES, ch. 4: The Influence of Experts (forthcoming in 
200_). 
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would produce jury judgment indistinguishable from the fourth 
version in which the expert reported a one in three chance of being 
correct.231 
In fact, neither the strong cross, nor the strong cross plus the 
opposing expert had a significant affect on the plaintiff expert’s 
persuasiveness, percentage of juries opting for death, or verdict 
confidence.  For example, in the weak cross condition forty-seven 
percent of the juries gave a death verdict, in the strong cross 
condition fifty-one percent recommended death, and in the strong 
cross plus opposing expert fifty percent recommended death.  The 
only condition with a different result was in the fourth, “control” 
condition where the plaintiff’s expert testified that predictions were 
wrong two-thirds of the time.  In this condition, thirty-nine percent of 
the juries recommended the death penalty.232  Diamond and Casper 
note that one possible interpretation of these results is that the jurors 
simply did not care about future dangerousness.  However, based on 
evidence from their deliberations, this is not the case.  Most juries 
explicitly discussed the issue, and there was a strong correlation 
between predictions of future dangerousness and verdict 
preferences.233  However, jury estimates of future dangerousness if 
released did not vary significantly across the three conditions where 
the plaintiff’s expert testified the defendant would kill again.234 
Another recent future dangerousness experiment using 
undergraduates as subjects by Krauss and Sales also explored the 
effects of cross-examination and opposing experts on juror 
evaluations.235  The jurors heard two types of experts give testimony.  
The “clinical opinion expert” based his judgment that the defendant 
was a severe sociopath and represented a future danger to society on 
his interview with the defendant and his years of experience.  The 
“actuarial expert” had identical experience and training as the 
clinical expert.  This expert used a dangerousness prediction 
actuarial instrument called the Violence Risk Assessment Guide 
(VRAG) to assess future dangerousness.  The expert explained the 
instrument and testified that based on his interview with the 
defendant and the VRAG results, he believed the defendant 
 
 231 DIAMOND & CASPER, supra note 230, at 41. 
 232 Id. at 41 t.4. 
 233 Id. at 43. 
 234 Id. at 43 t.5. 
 235 Krauss & Sales, supra note 154.  Unfortunately, this study did not have the 
subjects deliberate, minimizing its ecological validity. 
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represented a future danger to society.236  The results indicated that 
the clinical expert was more effective than the actuarial expert in 
changing the mock juror’s dangerousness ratings. 
The testimony of both types of experts was met with opposing 
expert testimony and an effective cross-examination that pointed out 
the high error rates of predictions of future dangerousness.  In this 
experiment, the cross-examination and opposing expert reduced 
mock juror assessment of future dangerousness from where it was 
after hearing the first expert’s testimony.  However, Krauss and Sales 
note that, “although adversary procedures had an impact on both 
types of expert testimony, their influence was significantly less on the 
clinical opinion expert testimony.  Adversary procedures failed to 
return mock jurors who received clinical opinion expert testimony to 
their initial dangerousness rating levels.”237  These studies suggest 
that, perversely, the Kuhn court may have had it backward when it 
suggested that clinical pure opinion testimony could be effectively 
countered through cross-examination and opposing expert 
testimony.  The limited research available suggests that this type of 
testimony is more impervious to cross-examination and opposing 
experts than technique evidence.238 
These studies do not resolve the question of the effectiveness of 
the “battle of the experts” and cross-examination.  Seidman and 
Casper offer the possibility that future dangerousness testimony is 
particularly difficult to overcome because it is consistent with beliefs 
and expectations already held by the jurors.239  However, the results 
are consistent with a study by Kovera and her colleagues.240  They 
varied the strength of the defense’s cross-examination of an expert 
witness.  Although manipulation checks revealed that jurors were 
sensitive to the relative strength of the cross-examination of the 
expert, this did not affect participant’s perceptions of the quality of 
the evidence nor did it affect the verdict.  This result was replicated in 
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 237 Id. at 302. 
 238 This may be due in part to the fact that jurors confronted with holistic 
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 240 Margaret Kovera et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Effects of 
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a second study by the same authors.241  Together, these experimental 
findings should give pause to the Kuhn court and others who believe 
that the traditional tools of the adversarial process are a full substitute 
to restrictions on the admissibility of unreliable expert testimony. 
These results raise another issue as well.  They lend support to 
the argument that rulings excluding unreliable evidence promote 
jury accuracy even if we assume jurors are as good as judges in 
assessing reliability.  Edward Imwinkelried sets forth this justification 
for Daubert in the following passage: 
The criterion is not whether the judge is more competent to 
decide the issue than the jury.  Rather, the test is whether there is 
a significant risk that the jurors’ exposure to the foundational 
testimony and the proffered evidence will distort their 
deliberations even when they make a conscious decision that the 
item of evidence is technically inadmissible.242 
If any opinion evidence is to be excluded because of an inadequate 
foundation, these experminents support the idea that it is better to 
separate the admissibility decision from the decision as to how much 
weight to give some testimony. 
CONCLUSION: SUMMARIZING THE RESEARCH 
Goldman’s five criteria offer one roadmap through the 
empirical literature on juries, judges, and the admissibility of expert 
testimony.  Jurors have trouble understanding expert testimony, 
especially in complex cases that involve statistical and probabilistic 
evidence.  This difficulty affects how they relate to expert witnesses.  
When the nature of the testimony is such that it is difficult for jurors 
to understand, they are more likely to engage in peripheral 
processing; that is they rely on factors other than the merits of the 
argument itself to determine the truth value of a message.  Such 
factors may include the expert’s credentials, the expert’s demeanor, 
how much the expert is paid, whether the expert’s findings have 
been published, and the number of experts (rather than the quality 
of their testimony). 
Expert opinion that rests solely on the experience of the expert 
may create similar problems for jurors.  The Supreme Court’s ipse 
dixit comment in Joiner243 can be understood in part as a recognition 
that whether or not an expert’s bare assertion based on professional 
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judgment is correct, such statements offer the jury no opportunity to 
engage in central processing and force it to accept or reject the 
assertion, presumably on other, often peripheral grounds.244 
Juror difficulties potentially are made worse by the status of the 
experts.  American expert witnesses are almost exclusively employed 
by the parties within the context of an adversarial proceeding.  In 
most contexts, when one is embedded in an adversarial process, one’s 
testimony is biased in favor of the side one is representing.  However, 
the effect of these biases on jurors in unclear.  There is evidence that 
jurors give greater scrutiny to adversarial versus non-adversarial 
expert witnesses.  Whether this greater scrutiny is sufficient to permit 
jurors to detect and discount expert bias is a question for which we 
have little empirical data. 
The fact that the parties choose the experts has another 
potentially misleading aspect.  The system favors selection of experts 
with extreme views, rather than views that are representative of the 
scientific community.  There is some evidence that this gives jurors 
the impression that there is less consensus in a field than actually 
exists.  Moreover, when we assess who to believe in situations where 
we are confronted with different versions of the truth, we may turn to 
demeanor as a clue to veracity.  This type of peripheral processing is 
in fact encouraged by the legal system.  Unfortunately, demeanor is 
often a poor cue, and in the case of expert testimony, the usefulness 
of demeanor cues is further attenuated by selection effects. 
If it is true that jurors will have a difficult time assessing the 
merits of the experts’ arguments in complex cases, and the process of 
selection and presentation of evidence is likely to diminish the 
usefulness of many peripheral cues to veracity, close scrutiny of 
testimony is potentially most beneficial in complex cases where 
peripheral processing is most likely.  Jurors may still engage in this 
type of processing, but the elimination of the least reliable evidence 
should reduce the egregiousness of errors that are made. 
But if jurors and experts are the problem, are admissibility rules 
imposed by judges the answer?  If the judge is to act as a gatekeeper, 
what evidence do we have that he or she is up to the task?  This 
question has two parts.  First, do judges have the skills to judge expert 
evidence, and second, in the context of a trial can they use the skills 
they have to sort out reliable and unreliable testimony.  Empirical 
research on these questions is limited and somewhat contradictory.  A 
survey of state judges indicates a shallow understanding of some 
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Daubert criteria, but a study of published federal court opinions 
suggests that as federal judges gain experience in evaluating 
reliability, their opinions became more scientifically sophisticated.  
Unfortunately, we do not have systematic evidence as to whether 
greater sophistication produces better decisions, that is, decisions 
that reliably distinguish between more and less reliable expert 
testimony. 
Even if judges are no better than jurors in assessing expert 
evidence, the Diamond and Casper research support the position of 
some evidence scholars that final outcomes will be better if the task of 
assessing admissibility is separated from the task of assigning the 
proper weight to each piece of evidence. 
In sum, I believe on balance, the empirical research does lend 
some support to the paternalistic justification for restrictions on the 
admissibility of unreliable expert testimony.  We are still left with 
many questions, however.  The following two seem to me to be 
particularly important.  First, is reliability a good principle upon 
which to base decisions?  Second, how stringent should admissibility 
criteria be? 
As to the first question, in my judgment reliability is a serviceable 
criterion.  Reliability itself is a complex, multidimensional set of 
considerations.245  Its very complexity can be a source of trouble, as 
seen in the survey of state court judges, but its complexity also allows 
judges to make sophisticated judgments. 
Evidence from the Rand study suggests that courts have used the 
reliability test to exclude the most unreliable evidence.  If this is the 
case, the result is consistent with the adoption of what Nance calls a 
“worst evidence principle:” “evidence law seeks to prevent jury error 
by filtering out the really bad evidence that is likely to lead the jury 
astray.”246  There is also some evidence that courts have been sensitive 
to the quality of the available evidence when making admissibility 
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decisions.  As better evidence becomes available, courts may not let 
experts base opinions on less reliable evidence that would be 
admissible in another context.247  This phenomenon, which might be 
called a “better evidence principle,” suggests that judges are using 
admissibility rulings to control advocates as well as juries.  Nance 
describes the advocate control approach as a way in which the judge, 
as an agent for the jury, is able “to protect juries from the epistemic 
consequences of third-parties’ choices—namely, the choices of the 
advocates about what evidence to present and how to present it.”248  
Whether or not judges are doing a good job in individual cases, it 
does appear that they are using admissibility decisions in a way that is 
consistent with a focused paternalistic justification. The federal 
opinion study of Dixon and Gill is consistent with the possibility that 
in face of heightened judicial scrutiny, the parties themselves have 
improved the overall quality of evidence. 
The second question is how stringent should the courts be?249  
How good is good enough?  Insofar as this is a question that solely 
concerns overall trial accuracy, the theoretical answer is up to the 
point where improvements in jury accuracy are offset by judicial 
errors in excluding evidence.  A more practical response might be 
that courts should be especially vigilant in monitoring weak evidence 
in cases involving complex questions, because jurors may have special 
difficulty assigning proper weight to such testimony.  This argument 
applies at least as strongly to experience evidence (what the Kuhn 
court called “pure opinion evidence”), as it does to other types of 
testimony.  As cases get closer on the merits, of course, the role of 
admissibility decisions as a means of assisting juries diminishes, if, for 
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no other reason, than the fact that as cases are closer and closer on 
the merits, it is not clear whether an outcome is more accurate.250 
Moreover, there are competing considerations.  As I noted 
above, some may disagree that the primary end in view of the law of 
evidence and of the trial itself is to uncover the truth.  They may 
argue that procedural justice considerations should trump 
substantive considerations and that both the parties and the society 
will be more supportive of outcomes that are the result of a jury 
verdict.  This paper is not the place for a full discussion of the 
relationship between substantive and procedural justice.  However, a 
few words are in order.  Procedures that are perceived to be fair, help 
to produce acquiescence even in the face of perceived outcome 
unfairness.  One well accepted theory advanced by Tyler and Lind 
points to three factors that are important to the belief that 
procedures are fair: (1) neutrality (the authority engages in 
evenhanded treatment), (2) trust (the authority tries to be fair), and 
(3) status recognition (the authority treats one politely, with dignity, 
and with respect for one’s rights and opinions).251  Adverse 
admissibility decisions, especially if they result in a directed verdict 
for the other party, may well be perceived to be unfair with respect to 
one or more of these factors.  For example, refusal to permit an 
expert to testify might be perceived as a lack of respect for one’s 
opinion. 
Undoubtedly, the plaintiff’s personal injury bar feels strongly 
that cases decided on the basis of the exclusion of expert opinion 
evidence are less legitimate.  Although most explain this position in 
substantive terms, e.g. jury verdicts are more accurate, it may also be 
true that their objection is partly procedural.  Pushed, they might say 
that jury judgments are “fairer,” and we should prefer them even if, 
on average, juries reach more erroneous results in the absence of 
admissibility rules that require reliable expert evidence.  The 
question, of course, is how erroneous?  Institutions that routinely fail 
to achieve substantive justice are likely to lose political and social 
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support even if they are perceived to be procedurally just.  The 
purpose of just procedures is not solely a way to “cool out” the losers 
in disputes.  It is also a way to arrange things so as to come as close as 
possible to achieving substantive justice.  Unfortunately, procedures 
designed to maximize substantive justice may conflict with 
procedures that are designed to maximize the perception of 
procedural justice.252  As is so often the case in law, the question is 
one of balance.  Some may strike the balance more in favor of 
procedural justice. 
However one may weigh these competing concerns, we should 
understand that the question of how high the admissibility hurdle 
should be is not only a narrow question of evidence law.  If the 
paternalistic instinct that underlies Daubert has any merit when we ask 
how high the bar should be, we are in part asking about the proper 
balance between procedural and substantive justice.  Unlike many 
quarrels in law, this one is about something important. 
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